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Abstract 
 
The present thesis investigates the role of justice when informing health policies such as 
the reforms of health systems or those aimed at tackling health inequalities.  
I set the problem as a case study derived from the reforms of the Chilean health system 
and the inequalities in health, especially those related to access and financing of 
healthcare and those derived from the pervasive inequalities in the determinants of 
health. Departing from the challenge that inequalities in health represent for us, I explore 
some of the alternative accounts that inform the debate regarding the organisation of the 
health system in Chile and continue my research questioning the concept of justice that 
will inform an account of justice in health. 
The outcome of this research is the development of a virtue-based account of justice in 
health that rescues the important role of virtuous agents to carry out just actions 
regarding health. Specifically, recognises the role of institutions as primary agents of 
justice in health, and the necessity to perfect their capacities to deliberate and act 
accordingly to render what they owes to the people they serve, i.e. to accomplish their 
right to health.   
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Introduction  
‘For this Government, there is a right to health. However, this simple statement is 
not enough for protecting the right to health; it needs the establishment of 
explicit [health-related] guarantees, namely access, opportunity, quality, and 
financial support. For doing so, it requires the instruments for generating an 
effective exercise of the right to health, by giving the users the power and 
mechanisms for claiming them.  
The health reform has one only North, that is, to give all the Chileans the best 
health care through the AUGE Plan, avoiding the present inequalities.’  
Presidential Address to the National Congress (Lagos, 2002)  
 
I was a privileged witness of the debate that led to the health reform during President 
Ricardo Lagos term in office (2000-2006) when I was junior advisor to the minister of 
health. During that period, I had the chance to observe and participate in discussions with 
people with different backgrounds—either political or academic—regarding what and 
how the health system should be reformed. I did realise that even though there was a 
shared diagnosis of the situation and good evidence in favour of technical solutions 
proposed to reform the Chilean health system, most of the difficulties to advance in 
agreeing a new system were rooted in the different philosophical accounts that inform 
the ideological backgrounds of the political parties of which the actors in the debate were 
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members or at least sympathisers. I was aware that an ideological background implies 
that one adopt a position—regarding any political debate—standing from the point of 
view of such an ideology. However, what captured my attention then was that the debate 
barely went upstream to the source of such differences; obviously, it happened because it 
was a political not a philosophical debate!  
As I was interested in go deeper in such a philosophical debate and my own background 
was weak to do that (Medicine, Paediatrics and Health Administration), I enrolled to 
pursue a master degree in Bioethics —at the same time the reform was approved and 
began to be implemented. My master’s thesis, entitled ‘Inequities in Health in Chile: The 
Limits of Chilean Health Reform from an Ethical Perspective’1, deals about the constraints 
the reform was confronting to accomplish what was intending to do: namely, (1) to 
realise the right to health by establishing explicit guarantees regarding healthcare, and (2) 
to reduce inequalities in health (See quote of President Lagos at the beginning of the 
chapter).  
After I obtained the ‘Master in Bioethics’ degree, I decided to enrol in a PhD program as I 
realised that this would enable me to do a more substantive contribution for new policies 
in health—going upstream in the ethical foundations of such policies when required.  
Although I have not obtained the PhD degree yet I can affirm that doing the research for 
this thesis has being an incredible support to take better informed decisions as Vice-
Minister of Public Health, position I occupy since 2014.  
                                                     
1 Original title in Spanish is: ‘Inequidades en Salud en Chile: Los límites de la reforma de la Salud Chilena 
desde una perspectiva ética’. The Master degree was awarded at the Catholic University of Chile. 
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The thesis I am submitting now ‘An enquiry concerning justice in health, or what ethical 
account best informs health policies aimed at tackling health inequalities’ is the reflection 
not only of the academic research that I have carried out during the long period of time I 
have needed to complete it. It is also product of my own process of maturation as a 
policymaker dealing with decisions regarding public health during that period of time.  
As the title indicates, this thesis concerns the search of an ethical account that best 
inform health policies that aim at justice in health, especially when they are intended to 
reduce health inequalities. I use the case of Chile for three reasons, namely: (1) it is the 
case I better know and the one that motivates this research, (2) it is a well-known case of 
application of radical neo-liberal reforms—including a health reform—that led to a fast 
economic growth but increased social inequalities—which in turn motivated a new health 
reform in recent times, and (3) such a reform confronted political positions with clearly 
identifiable accounts of justice. 
The thesis is divided into three parts. In the first part, I intend to delineate the problem 
that motivates this enquiry. In the second part, I intend to configure what I think should 
be a better account of justice to inform health policies to tackle health inequalities. 
Finally, in the third part I explain how this account was useful to contribute to inform the 
creation of a system to address the problem of high-cost treatments. 
Part I: ‘Delineating the Problem’, consists of three chapters. The Chapter 1 starts with a 
short description of the formation of Chilean health system and the reforms 
implemented. It focuses particularly in two substantial reforms that the Chilean health 
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system has undergone: the neo-liberal reform carried out during Pinochet’s dictatorship 
and the egalitarian reform of President Lagos. I then describe confronting theories of 
justice that inform the main actors in the debate regarding health reform in Chile and the 
difficulties to match these theories to the practice. Chapter 2 focus on the problem of 
health inequalities that concerns to any health system—but it is especially problematic 
for a country characteristically unequal like Chile— and the moral justification to seek 
reducing such inequalities. In Chapter 3, I intend to go further on explaining why it is 
important to tackle health inequalities on Justice’s grounds and why a different account is 
required to inform health policies for that purpose. 
Part II: ‘A Justice Account to Inform Health Policies’ contains two chapters. In Chapter 4, I 
elaborate the basis for an account of Justice departing from the concept of justice that 
will inform such an account. Chapter 5, in turn describe the components of the concept of 
justice I developed when it is to be applied on health issues. 
Part III: ‘Justice in Health and the Problem of High-Cost Treatments’ contains just one 
chapter, the number 6, which describes the problem that emerged in Chile regarding 
high-costs treatments —that are not included in the AUGE system created in the recent 
reform— and have a catastrophic financial. Later, this chapter describes the system 
created to afford the problem of high-costs treatments for which the account of justice 
described in the second part was a useful input to inform its design.  
Finally, the thesis finishes with the Conclusions, where I intend to summarise the findings 
of this enquiry and raise further questions to afford in future research. 
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Part I: Delineating the Problem 
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1. The Chilean health system  
 
 
1.1. The history of the Chilean health system and its reforms 
The history of the Chilean health system2 begins with the Spanish colonization of the 
territories of what is now known as Chile, when they established the first hospital in 
Santiago in 1552—eleven years after the city was founded. It is possible to recognise 
several milestones during this history that makes of Chile an innovator in the organization 
of its health system in the context of Latin American countries (Jimenez & Bossert, 1995; 
Bossert & Leisewitz, 2016). Some of these milestones were the formation of a Board of 
Health in 1805 to vaccinate against smallpox; the creation of the Board of Directors of 
Hospitals and Shelters in 1832, giving a public role to the private charity hospitals; and the 
establishment of the General Bureau of Health in 1887, as the first public health 
authority.  
The first quarter of the twentieth century witnesses the consolidation of the public health 
functions through the enactment of the first ‘Sanitary Code’ (Law No. 3385, 1918) which 
established public responsibilities regarding sanitation and preventive health programs; 
and the adoption of a Bismarkian system3 for health coverage, through the Social Security 
Law (Law No. 4054, 1924). Chile was one of the first countries in implementing such a 
system after Germany. 
                                                     
2 According to the World Health Organization a health system consists of ‘all the people and actions whose 
primary purpose is to improve health’ (WHO, 2000):1 or more specifically ‘all organizations, people and 
actions whose primary intent is to promote, restore or maintain health’ (WHO, 2007:2). 
3 The Bismarkian system is also known as Social Health Insurance; it was first introduced in Germany in 
1883 by Chancellor Otto von Bismarck through several so-called ’sickness funds’  
that had mandatory enrollment and defined benefits (Carrin & James, 2005; Bump, 2010) 
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Later, Chile performed the first large reform to its health sector, adopting a National 
Health Service (Law No. 10383, 1952) that organised the public and private providers into 
one integrated system for primary, secondary and tertiary healthcare, and financing it 
through both social security contributions and general taxes revenues. The Chilean NHS 
was the product of eleven years of debate in the National Congress, which begun in 1941 
when the legislators of the then ruling Popular Front4 introduced a bill to create it. 
Through that debate a wide consensus across the political spectrum from communists to 
conservatives was reached. One of the driving forces to attain such as a consensus was 
data confirming the inequalities between unprotected poor families compared to 
workers’ families with social security protection, such as a mortality rate ten times higher 
(Jimenez & Bossert, 1995 p.160). The main focus of NHS was maternal and child health; 
therefore, programs were progressively developed aiming at improving their health 
status. They were highly effective: significantly improved maternal and child health and 
nutrition, tackling communicable disease rates. The infant mortality rate dropped from 
136 per 1000 live births in 1950, to 33 per 1000 live births by 1980; the prevalence of 
malnutrition among children at age of 6 years declined from 37% to 11.5% (Jimenez & 
Romero, 2007). The wide consensus about the objectives and characteristics of the NHS 
remained during almost three decades since 1952, even though different political parties 
and coalitions succeeded the Popular Front in government such as Nationalists (1952-58), 
Liberal-Conservatives (1958-64), Christian Democrats (1964-1970), and finally Marxists-
Leninists (1970-1973) that were deposed by the coup d’état led by General Augusto 
Pinochet (1973-1990). 
                                                     
4 The Popular Front was integrated by the Radicals (Social Democrats), the Socialists, the Communists and 
other minor Left wing parties. It governed Chile from 1938 to 1945. 
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1.2. A neo-liberal reform of Health System 
Pinochet’s dictatorship was ideologically inspired by the Doctrine of National Security, 
which emerged in Latin American countries as the outcome of the anti-communist 
counterinsurgency training—in the context of the Cold War— developed by the U.S. Army 
School of the Americas (SOA) since 1946 onwards (Viera-Gallo, 1978; Calvo, 1979). Its 
focus on national security was the centre of the political development that resulted in the 
instauration of a new Constitution in 1980 (Bertelsen, 1989). Nevertheless, Pinochet’s 
regime also adopted a neoliberal social and economic agenda that led him to impose a 
private property market economy in Chile (Fischer, 2009). Similar to the influence of SOA 
over the Chilean military officers, it was the influence of the University of Chicago’s 
School of Economics: since 1955 onwards—thanks to an alliance with the Chilean Catholic 
University—many Chilean young economists pursued postgraduate studies there working 
directly under Milton Friedman and Arnold Harberger tuition. These economists, known 
as ‘Chicago Boys’, formed the economic team that implemented radical economic 
reforms during Pinochet’s dictatorship (Valdés, 1995). This process was later reinforced 
thanks to the influence of two important world leaders—Margaret Thatcher and Ronald 
Reagan— and the role played by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund: 
loans given to developing countries were conditioned upon reducing the size of the 
state’s and its involvement in the economy, allowing the private sector to get involved in 
areas that had been previously understood to be a priority or exclusive area for the state. 
This was the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’. 
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The reforms carried out by Pinochet’s Chicago boys were intended to reduce the role of 
the state and infuse competition and individualism into areas such as labour relations, 
pensions, education and health. The former Pinochet’s minister of health, Air Force 
General Francisco Herrera made a series of declarations to Chilean newspapers during 
1974 to explain their plans:  
‘We are moving gradually from a statist health system —without giving up free 
attention to the needy— to a concept of free market, which is something complex 
and difficult and for that reason, it has to be done with caution, but with audacity 
and aggressiveness, also with decision’ (Herrera, 1974 as cited in Tetelboin & 
Salinas, 1984 p.365). 
‘1975 is the year of transition for the incorporation of health to the free market 
economic policy of the government; payment of health care must relate to the 
ability of citizens to afford it proportionally to family income’ (Herrera,  1974 as 
cited in Raczynski, 1983 p.13). 
The neoliberal influence was key in the evolution of the role assigned to the state in the 
area of health. For instance, the Constitution of 1925 emphasized the state's role as 
guarantor of Public Health as part of the ‘social rights’:  
‘It is the duty of the State to ensure the public health and hygienic welfare of the 
country. Each year, enough money [from public budget] must be destined to 
maintain a National Health Service’ (Chilean Constitution, 1925, Art 10 No.16). 
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The Constitution of 1980, enacted by the dictatorship, promotes the idea of the 
protection of health from the standpoint of individuals, and emphasises individual 
freedom to take care of one’s own health. The new Constitution, aims at reducing state’s 
intervention in the implementation of health actions —through guaranteeing the 
freedom to choose either private or public healthcare— which determined the existence 
of two healthcare systems operating in parallel: 
‘It is the primary duty of the State to guarantee the implementation of health 
actions, whether undertaken by public or private institutions, in the form and 
manner prescribed by law. Every person shall have the right to choose the health 
care system that they wish, whether public or private’ (Chilean Constitution, 1980 
Art 19. No.9). 
The reform led to the decentralization of the National Health Service —creating the 
National System of Health Services—, the transference of primary care to municipalities, 
and the creation of the National Fund of Health (FONASA) (Decree No.2763, 1979). Later, 
a new decree (Decree No.3, 1981) allowed the creation of private health insurances 
(ISAPRE), which were intended to gradually replace the social security. 
Therefore, Pinochet’s health reform transformed the once integrated Chilean healthcare 
system into a mixed public-private system as much in the provision as in the financing of 
services, aiming at the introduction of market economy to allocate resources for health. 
According to Rafael Caviedes (Caviedes, 1995) —former Director of FONASA during the 
dictatorship— these changes were based on four principles, namely Individual Liberty, 
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Justice, Property right and Subsidiarity. Individual Freedom consisting of the right to 
choose the health insurance, or to choose the health care provider as well as the freedom 
to decide how much of their resources are devoted to health-related purposes. Justice in 
this case would mean to each one according to his contribution, which implies that each 
one receives health care according to how much he/she pays, directly or through a health 
insurance. Property right implies the right to decide the fate of one’s own possessions, for 
example, deciding how much to expend in health insurance. Subsidiarity implies state 
intervention for health actions only when choice cannot be made by the individual or 
private sector initiative, so as to ensure an acceptable minimum. 
The reforms made during the ‘80s of twentieth century, combined with the effects of the 
economic crisis in the first half of that decade, led to a strong reduction of the fiscal 
contribution to the health sector that resulted in the deterioration in access and in the 
quality of care for the Chilean people with low and middle incomes. For its part, the 
private insurance system showed a series of failures such as exclusions for those with pre-
existing conditions, low coverage in the area of catastrophic risks, risk discrimination and 
lack of transparency in prices and coverage. 
After the restoration of democracy, the first two terms in office of the Center-Left 
coalition ‘Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia’ (Coalition of Parties for 
Democracy) focused on regaining public investment in the health sector, especially in 
hospitals infrastructure —strongly deteriorated in previous years— starting a significant 
program of investment, associated with the recovery of endowments and wages for 
public sector workers. The intention of President Eduardo Frei (1994-2000) was to carry 
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out a significant reform to the health system. However the administration failed to 
overcome the obstacles imposed by the lack of a shared vision within his coalition and 
heavy pressure from labour organizations. Frei had to postpone his reform plans given 
alternative priorities such as the educational reform and judicial reform. Nevertheless, 
Frei’s administration introduced important changes to the organization and the financing 
of healthcare system, in order to provide greater equity and efficiency within the public 
healthcare system: strengthening FONASA, implementing new payment systems such as 
the ‘per capita payment’ to primary care providers and the ‘diagnostic-associated’ 
payment at hospital level; and creating new programs aimed at specific problems such as 
the Opportunity Attention Program to reduce surgical waiting lists, the Catastrophic 
Insurance program and the Elderly program . 
At the end of the first ten years of Centre-Left coalition in office, a number of problems in 
the Chilean healthcare system still persisted, such as unequal access to healthcare, 
weakened public hospitals, lack of regulation of the private system, an inadequate model 
of care to address the demographic and epidemiological changes, and inadequate funding 
directly used for the realisation of benefits (Lenz, 2007). 
 
1.3. The recent reform of the Chilean Health System  
The Health System reform became one of the iconic achievements of the administration 
of Ricardo Lagos, getting  broad political and academic support, as well as social support 
for the transformations generated (SdS, 2008). This reform—carried out between 2002 
and 2005—aimed at (1) to realise the right to health by establishing explicit guarantees 
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regarding healthcare, and (2) to reduce inequalities in health, recognising and 
guaranteeing equal access to healthcare and equalizing health conditions to correct the 
inequities in health status.  
An important precedent for this reform was the World Health Report 2000. In its 
introductory message former WHO director Dr. Gro Harlem Brundtland states: 
 ‘The report breaks new ground in the way that it helps us understand the goals of 
health systems. Clearly, their defining purpose is to improve and protect health – 
but they have other intrinsic goals. These are concerned with fairness in the way 
people pay for health care, and with how systems respond to people’s expectations 
with regard to how they are treated. Where health and responsiveness are 
concerned, achieving a high average level is not good enough: the goals of a 
health system must also include reducing inequalities, in ways that improve the 
situation of the worst-off’ (WHO, 2000 p.viii. Italics are mine). 
The world health report 2000 presented for the first time an index of national health 
systems’ performance in trying to achieve three overall goals: good health, 
responsiveness to the expectations of the population, and fairness of financial 
contribution. Among 191 countries, Chile ranked: 32nd for good health; 45th for 
responsiveness; and 168th (!) for financial fairness (WHO, 2000 p.152). Effectively, even 
today Chile is a country characterized by significant social inequalities, and within them, 
health inequalities are prominent (PNUD, 2017).  
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For the time the reform was proposed, there were clear conscience that Chilean health 
system had good results in global health indicators—like life expectancy and infant 
mortality— that consistently improved in the country during previous decades. Infant 
mortality had decreased from 32 per 1000 live births in 1980 to 10.1 per 1000 live births 
in 1999, life expectancy had increased from 67 years in 1980 to 75 in 1995-2000, and 
general mortality had diminished from 6.6 per 1000 inhabitants in 1980 to 5.3 in 1999. 
Nevertheless, not all socioeconomic groups benefited equally from these improvements. 
There were notorious differences between rich and poor communities, for example for 
the life expectancy at county level.  For 1996, male life expectancy at birth ranges from 
66.1 to 85.7 year according to the socioeconomic condition of the county; for females, 
the range spanned from 73.3 to 84.7 years (Vega 2002). The infant mortality was 5 times 
higher in those infants born from mothers with less than 8 years of education as 
compared with those born from mothers with 12 or more years of education (Hollstein 
1998). 
The reform started through a process of prioritisation of health problems, setting up four 
‘Health Objectives for the Decade 2000-2010’ (MINSAL, 2002). Based on them, the 
ministry of health defined specific goals in priority areas, setting up the general strategies 
for achieving each objective, including evidence-based interventions in the areas of 
promotion, prevention, treatment and rehabilitation. The four objectives were: 
1. Improve and maintain successes in health already achieved. 
2. Address the challenges of population’s ageing and other changes in society. 
3. Reduce health inequalities. 
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4. Provide services that meet the needs and expectations of the population. 
The document ‘Health Objectives for the Decade 2000-2010’ additionally explains that to 
achieve equity through healthcare interventions it is necessary to reduce the risks and 
improve health status of those most vulnerable—those who belong to disadvantaged 
socio-economic groups. The document explicitly appeals to the general principles of 
justice developed by Rawls in his Theory of Justice which should help to define ‘those 
inequalities in health corresponding to inequities’ (p.229). Similarly, it states that to 
determine the justice of a distribution of health status, it is necessary to know the causes 
and determinants as elements that must necessarily be addressed to achieve an equitably 
distributed health status. 
After delivering the document about health objectives, president Lagos’ administration 
presented a bill to create the System of Universal Access with Explicit Guarantees in 
Health (AUGE) (MINSAL, 2004)5. This system constitutes the core of the reform as it 
establishes the rules for the progressive specification of patients’ entitlements regarding 
to their right to health. According to these rules, the ministry of health would 
progressively determine a list of prioritised health problems and the corresponding 
medical procedures and interventions that the patients must receive.  
Each explicit guarantee is characterised through four dimensions (Sandoval, 2004):  
                                                     
5 Law 19966 that establishes AUGE system, together with the Law 19,937 that reframes Health Authorities 
and laws 19895 and 20015 that regulate private healthcare insurances (ISAPRE) constitute the legal 
framework of the reform of the Chilean health system. 
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 Access: the levels of healthcare —namely primary, secondary or tertiary care—
required for each health intervention included,  
 Quality: the standards for clinical practice and procedures that practitioners and 
institutions that deliver health care —either public or private— must comply,  
 Opportunity:  the time limits set to deliver care, and  
 Financial Protection: the financial coverage for each intervention, so that people who 
have a health problem included in the regime do not see their situation worsened due 
to the expenses involved in treating the disease.  
Law 19966 establishes that every three years the Ministry of Health must dictate a decree 
a listing AUGE health problems and the interventions required for their treatment. Such a 
list must consider: (1) the burden of disease, (2) the effectiveness of interventions— in 
terms of their contribution to the extent of life or the quality of life— and (3) their cost-
effectiveness. The cost of the interventions included in the decree should not exceed the 
budget the Ministry of Finance determines for funding interventions in the public 
healthcare system.  
1.4. Confronting accounts of justice in the health system reform  
 
The preamble of AUGE’s bill stated that health reform the Government was intending to 
carry out was based on five principles: the Right to Health, Solidarity, Efficiency, Social 
Participation and Equity. The meaning of each principle is summarised as follows: 
• The Right to Health is the right of every person living in Chile to have a social 
protection mechanism of universal access to appropriate health care, and the 
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existence of healthy conditions in their community and work within the capabilities 
and resources of the country.  
• Solidarity is the effort of the Chilean society to guarantee that the most vulnerable 
people will receive the same as those who are better off.  
• Efficiency is the principle to make the best use of available resources, obtaining the 
best possible results with those resources.  
• Social Participation involves recognizing people as users and citizens, so that they can 
express their preferences and expectations for improving health policy through 
transparent mechanisms for information and participation. 
• On Equity, the bill states: ‘Equity in health is a moral imperative that is at the root of 
the will to reform. Healthcare reform aims at reducing avoidable and unfair 
inequalities, by way of giving greater social protection and universal access to 
healthcare. [ ... ] Equity is the result of an intentional action to identify and reduce 
factors or conditions that cause avoidable inequalities and so we must devote our 
best efforts’ (Lagos, 2002 VI.Viii.). 
The Government of President Ricardo Lagos opted for the use of a concept of equity in 
health whose primary object is the equal access to and utilization of healthcare services, 
but also aims at the factors that determine an unequal distribution health, specifically to 
the social determinants of health. This concept—as mentioned above—would be 
informed specifically by Rawls’ account of Justice, and seeks a distribution of health that 
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contributes to a democratic equality. This explicit statement is representative of one of 
the competing accounts or theories of justice that informed the confronting positions 
regarding the reform of the health system. It is possible to group such accounts into 
three: (1) Egalitarian theories, which informed the platform of the centre-left coalition 
that pushed for the reform of the health system; (2) Libertarian theories, which in turn 
informed the centre-right coalition; and (3) Utilitarian theories, which although would not 
inform a specific political coalition, is traditionally regarded as important in informing 
health policies and policymakers.  
 
1.4.1. Egalitarian theories 
Egalitarianism generally involves favouring some kind of equality, based on the idea 
that all people have the same value in moral terms; so it covers a wide range of views, 
from Marxist to Liberal Egalitarianism (Arneson, 2002). However, the use of the term 
here refers more specifically to theories that emphasises equality of rights, especially 
those who fall into the categories of civil, social and cultural rights such as the right to 
vote, the right to education, and the right to health (liberal egalitarianism). The 
importance of such rights is not given by any intrinsic value attached to the right, but 
by the degree of freedom that the state can ensure to individuals through the 
protection of such rights. These accounts challenge the identification of freedom with 
private property, based on the fact that the free market creates less advantaged social 
groups. The members of such groups are in a situation of less freedom than those 
from more advantaged groups. 
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One of the most important theorists of Liberal Egalitarianism is John Rawls. His Theory 
of Justice proposes that a just society is one whose social institutions satisfy certain 
principles of justice —accepted by the individuals who make up society—assigning 
rights and duties fairly, i.e. without making arbitrary distinctions between them. Rawls 
thinks that the key task of those interested in justice is to understand ‘Justice as 
Fairness’. On his view, justice’s primary object is the basic structure of society, 
meaning the basic arrangement of social institutions6 to distribute rights and duties, 
as well as the distributions of goods (Rawls, 1971 pp.3-16). 
Rawls builds upon the conception of the social contract, understanding society as a 
cooperative endeavour, characterized by common as much as conflicting interests. 
Rawls’ approach is that the object of the original agreement of the social contract, are 
those principles of justice that the social institutions that constitute the basic 
structure of society must satisfy. People — as free and rational individuals, looking 
after their own interests — when placed in an initial position of equality, would accept 
certain principles of justice that specify the types of social cooperation, regulating all 
subsequent agreements and forms of government that can be established. These 
principles of justice should specify how the rights and the duties are to be 
determined, and the fair distribution of the benefits provided by a shared life. 
The initial position of equality implies that, at the origin of the social contract, all 
people have the same rights to choose principles, in so far as (1) they have a 
                                                     
6 Some examples Rawls gives of such social institutions are: the Constitution, the freedom of thought and 
conscience, market competition, private ownership of the means of production, and the monogamous 
family, among others (Rawls, 1971 p.6). 
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conception of what is good for them and (2) they have a sense of justice. However, a 
condition for choosing such principles is that, at the origin, people will not know what 
position they will have in that society (they are behind the ‘veil of ignorance’), as a 
way to exclude bias arising from any individual advantage or disadvantage due to 
either natural or social contingencies, which would mislead the choice of principles of 
justice (Rawls, 1971 pp.17-21). 
In the context of deciding behind the veil of ignorance, according to Rawls people 
would choose two principles: (1) the principle of equal basic liberties and (2) the 
principle of fair equality of opportunity and differentiation. 
The first principle means that ‘each person *is+ to have rights equal to the most 
extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others’ (p.67). In talking of 
basic liberties, Rawls understands this to include political freedom (the right to vote 
and be elected), freedom of speech, freedom of conscience and thought, the right to 
physical integrity, the right to ownership and the ‘rule of law’. 
For its part, the second principle holds that social and economic inequalities are just 
only if they produce benefits for everyone, and particularly for the least advantaged; 
and offices and positions are open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity. This is what Rawls calls ‘Democratic Equality’ (pp.65-73), which must 
provide the social base for self-respect, and the belief of citizens that the horizon of 
life is fair. 
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Amartya Sen is another influential contemporary thinker within the framework of 
egalitarianism. He criticises Rawls because of the importance he gives to the 
expectations of primary social goods as the basis of interpersonal comparisons, and 
not to the relationship between people and goods. According to Sen, Rawls does not 
take sufficient account of the differences that people take advantage of in relation to 
the use of such goods in terms of welfare, whatever the meaning we give to this term. 
Thus, Sen develops the concept of capabilities with which he intends to emphasize the 
urgency with which certain goods are required by the people. He mentions, for 
example, the ability to move, ability to feed, to provide oneself with clothing or 
shelter and have power to participate in the community (Sen, 1980, 2004 and 2006). 
 
1.4.2. Libertarian Theories 
Libertarian theories focus on two fundamental aspects: individual liberty and the right 
to property. This results in the state's duty to ensure that nothing and no one can 
interfere with what the individual wants to do with his property or with himself, not 
even the state (Fisher and Gormally, 2001). This leaves in the hands of every individual 
the freedom to improve his/her circumstances and protect his/her health, according 
to their own initiative (Beauchamp and Childress, 2001). Its promoters support the 
thesis that free market is the only legitimate method of allocating resources, 
relegating the state to a minimal role—just to guarantee that free market will function 
without interferences that might be directed to some determinate distribution 
(Hayek, 1966 p. 615). 
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Libertarian theories were boosted during the 1980s, thanks to the coincidence in 
political leadership in the United States and the United Kingdom, two enthusiastic 
supporters of these theories: Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, who generated a 
global trend focused on the reduction of the role of the state and minimization of its 
participation in all sectors. Chile became one of the exponents of this view. 
From this philosophical standpoint, Robert Nozick (1974) suggests a conception of 
justice consisting of impartial mechanisms operating on property transactions: that is, 
justice is conceived of as a procedural concept. A fair distribution is the one that gives 
everyone that for what he/she can claim a proprietary right, so that justice is based 
not on equality of outcome between people, but in respect for private property, as 
well as the free acquisition and transmission of property. Therefore, justice is possible 
under three principles (1) the principle of just acquisition of property, (2) the principle 
of fair transfer of property, and (3) the principle of rectification of those acquisitions 
or transfers that have not been conducted in accordance with the law. ‘The whole 
principle of distributive justice simply says that a distribution is just if everyone is 
entitled to the possessions that [they] possess under the distribution ... If the 
properties of each person are in justice, then the full set (the distribution) of the 
properties is also fair’ (Nozick, 1996 p.235).  
In the field of health, another representative of libertarian thought, Milton Friedman, 
who was mentor of the Chicago Boys (See 1.2), argued that government involvement 
in health care is a major cause of the problem of rapidly growing costs and lack of 
availability of medical care. According to Friedman, such an involvement leads to an 
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increase in bureaucracy and therefore increased expenditure and fall in production; it 
is what he calls ‘Gammon’s Law’ or 'Theory of bureaucratic displacement'. The 
solution to this is privatisation of health care and major reduction in the role of 
government (Friedman, 1992; Friedman, 2001). 
The libertarian theories critically influenced the vision of healthcare as a commodity, 
i.e., an asset that it is feasible to purchase or to sell, allowing the free market into 
both the provision of health services and health financing; reducing state action in this 
field to guarantee the compliance with and the correct functioning of such a market. 
This is the account that inspired Pinochet’s reforms to health system in Chile and is 
still core of centre-right coalition political platform. 
1.4.3. Utilitarian Theories 
From a utilitarian perspective, the moral value of an action is given by the 
contribution such an action makes to general welfare or utility, which may be 
understood as the sum of total pleasure (classical utilitarianism) or the satisfaction of 
preferences (preference utilitarianism)  (Gandjour and Lauterbach, 2003).  
On this view of justice each individual counts for one and no more than one. Duties 
and Rights will depend on ‘convenience’, i.e. how much they contribute to maximizing 
the utility, so each right has no intrinsic value, but is justified through the contribution 
it makes in relation to welfare (Beauchamp and Childress, 2001 p.231). The relevant 
matter is that the rules governing the distribution of advantages and disadvantages 
maximize the utility or welfare. 
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The importance of health in this context lies in the contribution that it makes to 
overall well-being. From a utilitarian standpoint, maximizing health contributes to the 
maximization of utility, but it is not the only factor that determines the maximization 
of the latter, so it must be reconciled with wealth maximization and other goods that 
act as means of increasing welfare (Gandjour and Lauterbach, 2003 p.237). This raises 
the basic foundation of health resource allocation according to criteria of cost-
effectiveness (Dolan, 2001).  
The use of measures of disease burden (e.g. DALYs)—which aim to encompass both 
the lifespan and quality of life—is a way to bring health to the concept of wellness. 
This allows to assign a common parameter to compare health with competing goods. 
For instance, if an intervention is more cost-effective it means that contributes most 
to welfare maximization and therefore should be privileged, regardless of who are the 
recipients of this intervention and the position they occupy in the social map (Anand 
and Hanson, 1997). We must note that cost-effectiveness studies are not related per 
se to justice. It is its use in making decisions to allocate resources to interventions that 
benefit some people and not others what should be examined in terms of justice 
(Fisher and Gormally, 2001 pp.55-70 ) . 
 
1.5. Matching Theory and Practice in Chilean Health Reform 
Even though president Lagos’ reform had its inspiration in Rawls’ Theory of Justice as a 
philosophical framework to define equity in health (See 1.3), the fact that we live in a 
democratic society —and the need to reach political support to carry out the reform— 
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forced the Government to reconcile its reform project with the ideas of those who 
supported the health system reform carried out by the Pinochet’s government, which was 
inspired instead by a libertarian standpoint, emphasizing freedom and identifying equity 
with equality of property rights that fully justified the introduction of  market as a system 
for the allocation of resources. Thereby, the reform had to keep market as a major force 
to allocate resources in health system, being only possible to introduce few regulations 
intending to reduce market failures while maintaining the freedom and property rights as 
major constraints on equality. 
An important issue regarding the concessions made to get political support to carry out 
the reform was the maintenance of the mandatory contribution in health on a fixed seven 
percent of salary. For those who earn less, this means a greater burden on their budget 
than for those who earn more—which becomes a regressive system. Moreover, middle 
class people affiliated to FONASA contribute twice to finance the poorest (those with no 
income) through the redistribution of their contribution within FONASA, and through the 
general taxes they also pay. Thus, while society as a whole is making a contribution to 
benefit the most disadvantaged (as it is intended from a Rawlsian perspective), the 
greatest effort is made by those who have a salary which is not high enough to affiliate to 
an ISAPRE, so they affiliate to FONASA. The government's initial proposal to divert 3/7 of 
the mandatory contribution of ISAPRE affiliates into a ‘Solidarity Fund’ that would benefit 
FONASA affiliates had to be dismissed. In the end, the view that ISAPRE affiliates have a 
property right over their mandatory contributions to the private insurance they choose 
prevailed. This had the result that the division between private and public system created 
by Pinochet’s reform —one system for ‘the rich’ and other for ‘the poor’— remained. 
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A different sort of difficulties, which is necessary to acknowledge, is that there are 
technical problems in designing a reliable system that realises an account of justice put in 
terms of equality of opportunities—and not in terms of health access or health status; for 
example, the definition about what should be guaranteed requires cost-effectiveness 
analysis. Effectiveness implies the reduction of a health problem, for example, in terms of 
burden of disease in the population, using the intervention that is being studied. 
However, calculating the burden of disease does not reflect the inequitable distribution of 
a health problem. In other words, one could compare the burden of disease, such as 
between two or more communities or social classes, which may show inequalities, but 
when studying the effectiveness of an intervention, it is usually done by comparing before 
and after an intervention in a population whose characteristics (income level, education, 
health system, etc.) are not relevant as part of that analysis (MINSAL, 1999).  
Likewise, it is possible that some interventions will eventually show high cost-
effectiveness for problems that are more prevalent among people in a better 
socioeconomic status, whereas interventions for problems more prevalent among those 
in a worst-off position are not that cost-effective, leading to prioritising the interventions 
that will further benefit the better-off. 
The use of cost-effectiveness analysis has more to do with a utilitarian view of health 
policies, as it privileges the sum of, for example, years of life lost due to premature death 
(PYLL) avoided by the intervention (See 1.4.3) One of the background studies supporting 
the definition of the Health Objectives of the Decade 2000-2010, the ‘Study of cost-
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effectiveness of interventions for major public health problems’, by the Ministry of Health 
acknowledges that: 
‘A health system is efficient if it is able to maximize the health status of the 
population given the resources available to it. Under this approach, the health of a 
person of high income and one of low income has the same value’ (MINSAL, 1999 
p.8). 
A final element of adequacy has to do with the focus within the margins of egalitarianism. 
As described previously, in theory the government seeks to lead health policy to the 
achievement of a more equitable health status, for which interventions are needed to 
reduce the effect of the determinants of the inequitable distribution of health status. But 
the core of the reform is focused on clinical interventions; meaning that the reform 
primarily aims at equalizing access and utilization of healthcare system resources. The 
reason for this is subordinated to another objective of the reform: the idea of fulfilling the 
constitutional right to health protection, requiring concrete guarantees that any citizen 
can claim effectively, before the appropriate health authorities or before the courts of 
justice (See 5.1). The problem is that in this way, the process of allocating resources in 
health, at the end of the day, prioritises the satisfaction of individual rights, instead of 
interventions that could affect public health or even the social determinants of health, 
which hardly could be claimed by somebody before the health authorities or a court of 
justice.  
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Summing up, Chilean health system reform builds upon an egalitarian standpoint about 
justice. Nevertheless, to carry out the intended reforms, Government had to make some 
concessions regarding its original proposals, as a consequence of the political negotiation 
with representatives of political parties that disagree with the egalitarian point of view 
and support the supremacy of liberty and property rights. Additionally, the scarcity of 
instruments to prioritise health interventions in terms of the ‘democratic equality’ 
(measuring for example the equality of opportunity gained with one or another 
intervention), had to be fulfilled with instruments that are usually in use in the field of 
Health Policy, as the analysis of cost-effectiveness. Such instruments are more related to 
a utilitarian point of view as they are intended to maximize the overall health status, and 
do not take into account the existence of inequities in health  
The characteristics of the system of guarantees and prioritization mechanisms set up with 
the reform process had the effect that the priority for public policy is to give access to 
health services and not to correct the social determinants that impact health of people 
and determine inequalities we see today.  
Thus we can conclude that the contingencies met in advance of reform, coupled with the 
presence of different criteria of rationality on health equity, have caused the reform to 
end up assigning equity in health status a value that ranks lower than the value of 
individual freedom and the welfare maximization in terms of utility.  
The contradiction between the egalitarian aspirations declared by the Government, with 
the outcome of the democratic procedures, which by the game of majorities and 
29 
 
 
minorities leads to outcomes that do not always fulfil our greatest aspirations, puts into 
question, in the first place, whether justice criteria reside or not in establishing 
reasonable and accountable procedures, as the liberal theory tell us, or they are only 
formal criteria which are part of a wider framework to build a just health system. 
Particularly, we can ask ourselves whether the problems found in the development of the 
healthcare reform are just practical problems that keep the theory in a strong position, or 
they are demonstrating the weaknesses that such a theory has, demanding from us to 
overcome them exploring alternative accounts to give a better theoretical framework 
that inform the policies we can develop in order to reduce or eliminate inequalities 
deemed as inequities. This is the objective of the enquiry we present in this thesis. 
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2. Inequalities in health 
 
 
2.1. An emerging problem for both health policy and ethics  
During the 20th Century, many developing countries experienced big changes that 
improved living conditions for both individuals (income, education, nourishment) and 
population (drinking water, waste disposal). Such progresses summed to an increase in 
medical knowledge and technological development led to a dramatic improvement in 
people’s health through the enhancement of the quality of life and extension in life 
expectancy, as never seen before.  
The substantive fall of mortality rates and the rise in life expectancy, together with the 
progressive fall of fecundity rates, resulted in significant changes to the age profile of the 
countries —less children and more elder people— as has happened before in developed 
countries. Additional to the ageing of population, the control of infectious diseases has 
changed the epidemiological pattern of disease, with the result of an increasing 
proportion of people affected by chronic and degenerative diseases. These large-scale 
changes in age and epidemiological transitions raise new challenges, forcing governments 
all over the world to perform significant reforms to their healthcare systems. 
Along with the ageing population and the shift in the epidemiological burden of disease, 
another element has emerged as a feature of the changes occurring in health over the 
last decades: the unequal distribution of the gains in terms of health status between 
social groups within each country and between countries. 
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Inequalities in health status have been recognized to exist for a long time ―at least from 
the mid-nineteenth century (Whitehead, 2000; Deaton, 2002). In England, William Farr 
described in 1841 health inequalities such as the higher rate of suicide among manual 
workers, relative to social groups with higher levels of education, thanks to the 
mandatory registration of deaths that began in 1837, incorporating age and cause of 
death, and the occupation of the deceased. 
However, over the last three decades inequalities in health have received growing 
attention from public health practitioners and researchers, and from national and 
international organizations. It is only since the 1970s that the problem of health 
inequalities begins to have a greater concern strongly driven by the Conference on 
Primary Health Care held in Alma-Ata in 1978, as part of the global movement Health for 
All. Its final declaration states: 
‘The existing gross inequality in the health status of the people particularly 
between developed and developing countries as well as within countries is 
politically, socially and economically unacceptable and is, therefore, of common 
concern to all countries’ (International Conference on Primary Health Care, 1978). 
In the early '80s, the Report on Health Disparities delivered by the group led by Douglas 
Black for the Department of Health and Social Services in the UK (Black Report) marks a 
milestone in the study of health inequalities. The study demonstrating, on the one hand, 
the relationship between poverty and disease, and on the other hand, that health 
inequalities had increased despite the establishment of the National Health System (NHS) 
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in 1948 (Black, Townsend and Davidson, 1982). The report suggests that inequalities were 
not due to a failure of the NHS, but to social inequalities: namely employment, income, 
education, quality of housing, food and work environment (Crombie, Irvine, Elliott and 
Wallace, 2005). 
Accumulated evidence after the Black Report has contributed strongly to delineating the 
concept of the Social Determinants of Health that—beyond the influence of genetics and 
biology—could help explain the incidence and prevalence of certain diseases, and 
therefore should be included in the design and planning of health policies (Graham, 2004, 
Graham and Kelly, 2004; Baum and Harris, 2006). Employment, income level, educational 
level, environment and housing, are some of the determinants that are directly related to 
health status both individually and collectively (Kelly, Morgan, Bonnefoy, Butt and 
Bergman, 2007). 
2.2. Facing the challenge of health inequalities. 
The evidence that there is a deep and growing gap in health status between rich and poor 
countries, and within countries between the rich and the poor, has been generating a 
growing concern about the problem of inequalities in health both in the academic world, 
and amongst governments and international organizations such as the World Health 
Organization, the Pan American Health Organization, the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund and the Inter-American Development Bank (Birdsall and Hecht, 1995; 
Bobadilla 1998; Braveman, 1998; Carr, Gwatkin, Fragueiro and Pande, 1999; De Kadt and 
Tasca 1993; Whitehead, 1992; PAHO, 1996; WHO, 2000 ). 
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In Chile, the concern about inequality has also been shown in technical and academic 
research within the health sector (Florenzano, Pino, Kaplán, & Burrows, 1995; Larrañaga, 
1996; Hollstein, Vega, & Carvajal, 1998; Bitran, oz, Aguad, Navarrete, & Ubilla, 2000; 
Kaempffer & Medina, 2000; Arteaga, Astorga, & Pinto, 2002; Bossert, Larranaga, Giedion, 
Arbelaez, & Bowsers, 2003; Araya, Rojas, Fritsch, Frank, & Lewis, 2006; Tugwell et al., 
2006; Gideon, 2007; Gonzalez et al., 2009; Vásquez, Paraje, & Estay, 2013), and has 
progressively involved other important areas of society. Authorities and other relevant 
actors in national political life have taken progressive awareness of the need to re-
orientate public policies in order to reduce such inequalities. 
The concern to address the problem of health inequalities seems to be related to our 
most intimate sense of justice (Cribb, 2005; Sen, 2006; Daniels, 2008). Prima facie, such 
inequalities emerge before us as an unfair situation, because we intuitively consider 
health as a special type of good, which has been called a ‘merit good’ - i.e., a good whose 
distribution should be determined by the distribution of other goods, such as wealth or 
education (Musgrave, 1987). However, the mere impression that growing inequalities in 
the health field are not compatible with justice is not sufficient to design and justify 
health policies to address the problem. Not all health inequalities are considered unfair, 
for example, the longer life expectancy of women relative to men. 
2.3. What justifies seeking to reduce health inequalities? 
Although the mere observation of inequalities does not necessarily imply that something 
is morally wrong—since some health inequalities could be considered ‘normal’ 
variations— in many cases the existence of inequalities in health will be held to be either 
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a moral problem itself or the consequence of a moral problem. What is it that makes us 
think that some inequalities in health are morally wrong? It is a very important question; 
however, from the point of view of those governments and agencies dealing with health 
inequalities, although it is relevant to know when such inequalities are morally wrong, it is 
also important to know what morally justifies actions aimed at reducing or eliminating 
such inequalities. It is a separate concern whether or not people ought to change a state 
of affairs that is morally wrong. Most of us could agree that to lie is morally wrong, but 
few would think that this could justify focusing public efforts on seeking to reduce lies 
within society. 
Before moving forward, looking for the answers to these questions, it is necessary to 
clarify what we mean by the concept of ‘health inequalities’. When we talk about health 
inequalities, we might be referring to different but related aspects of health, namely 
health status (typically measured by life expectancy at birth, infant mortality or mortality 
rates, etc) or access to healthcare (i.e. health services use and financing). Which aspect of 
inequalities in health matters most depends on the point of view of who is analysing the 
problem (Gwatkin, 2000; Oliver & Mossialos, 2004). The current focus of attention is set 
mainly on inequalities of health status; maybe because such inequalities remain or even 
continue to grow, despite the reduction of inequalities in access to healthcare (Gakidou et 
al., 2000). Since the Black Report was published (Black et al., 1982) epidemiologists and 
social scientists have continued to reveal evidence to support the idea that a large 
proportion of actual health status inequalities derive from social inequalities —namely, 
variations in socio-economic status, gender, race or ethnicity, migration history, degree of 
urbanization, and religion or caste (Acheson et al., 1998; Braveman et al., 2004; 
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Contoyannis & Forster, 1999; Graham, 2004; Marmot, 2006; Marmot, 2002; Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics, 2007; Peter, 2001). For this reason, ‘health inequalities’ has been 
widely used as a term to refer to the inequalities in health between the more and less 
socially-advantaged groups of a population (Braveman & Gruskin, 2003; Braveman, 2003). 
However, health inequalities are not only socially determined —there are also health 
inequalities determined by biological or genetic determinants as well as individual 
choices. Therefore, it seems clearer using the term social inequalities in health when 
referring to inequalities derived from social determinants of health like social 
advantage/disadvantage, and to reserve the use of the broader term health inequalities 
for use as a broader concept that refers to ‘the differences, variations, and disparities in 
the health achievements of individuals and groups’ (Kawachi et al., 2002 p.647).   
2.4. What is it that makes us think that some inequalities in health are 
morally wrong?  
This is a tricky question, as evaluating something as morally wrong may depend on the 
standpoint of who is asking the question. In the case of health inequalities, an utilitarian 
could say that health inequalities are morally wrong because they affect the total utility 
within a society (Woodward & Kawachi, 2000); a libertarian would say they are wrong 
insofar as they affect acquisition and transfer of goods; even an egalitarian answer might 
depend on what sort of equality is at stake, namely equality of opportunities, equality of 
wealth, equality of rights, or the like. Nevertheless, what it is captured by the claim of 
moral wrongness of certain kinds of state of affairs—such as health inequalities— is that 
it is unacceptable in a normative sense; in other words, this state of affairs is beyond 
what ought to be accepted according to a value judgement (Scanlon, 1996). 
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Some inequalities in health, such as an infant mortality rate for black infants that is twice 
that of white infants in the same country or, that rates of infant mortality may be three or 
more times higher across groups of mothers with different educational attainments, are 
usually judged an unacceptable state of affairs.  The unacceptability of some inequalities 
in health—such as these—derives from the value judgement that they represent some 
kind of self-evident injustice, or raise a sentiment of injustice when they are 
contemplated.  However, self-evident injustice or a sense of injustice is certainly not 
enough argument to qualify inequalities in health as morally wrong; the relevant issue is 
that we can use the ‘point of view of justice’ as a reference point from which we can 
morally judge such a state of affairs. It suggests that justice is—at least— a reasonable 
starting point to respond to what it is that makes health inequalities wrong in a moral 
sense (Daniels, 2008; Woodward & Kawachi, 2000). This is not a novel idea, many people 
support the thought that we should reduce health inequalities departing from the point 
of view of justice, as far as they represent health inequities—this is to say health 
inequalities ’deemed to be unfair or stemming from some form of injustice’ (Kawachi et 
al.,  2002 p.647). In other words, there would be a moral duty to alleviate or eliminate 
health inequalities when they are inequities; therefore, the concept ‘health inequities’ 
incorporates a normative value related to justice: we ought to be committed to reducing 
or eliminating health inequities. Some people, going further, suggest that where such 
inequalities are not deemed unjust, there would be no duty to alleviate or eliminate them 
(Wilson, 2011).  
The obvious question following from such a normative statement is ‘what inequalities 
should fall under the category of inequities?’  However, another question that could 
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modify whatever we answer to this question seems prior to it; namely, do we have a duty 
to reduce health inequalities even when they are not inequities? We have just two 
possible answers to this question: Yes or No. Let me start with a ‘No’: if this was the 
case—we do not have a duty to reduce health inequalities that are not inequities— we 
can put such inequalities deemed as inequities aside and just concentrate on those 
inequalities that fall under the category of inequities. But if the answer is yes—there is a 
moral duty to reduce health inequalities, even though they are not deemed unjust—then, 
whatever our account of justice was, it should be able to account for the reduction of 
health inequalities both inequities and non-inequitable inequalities.  
Whilst it is commonly accepted that justice provides a good reason for reducing health 
inequities—independently of what ‘justice’ means— it is not clear prima facie that justice 
could justify reducing health inequalities that are not deemed unjust. However, it is a fact 
that some actions in the field of health are intended to reduce inequalities in health that 
are not considered inequities. For instance, some such interventions aim at equalizing 
differences in health status derived from biological variations—or from freely chosen 
health-damaging behaviours (Rogers, 2007). In such cases, one might appeal to justice to 
justify such actions but one alternatively might appeal to other values such as 
beneficence, solidarity, or the like, as a means of justifying such actions.  
Whether the latter was the case, a question raises: values such as solidarity or 
beneficence do impose a moral obligation to reduce or to eliminate health inequalities in 
the same way justice seems to do? There are two possible answers to this question: The 
first is to recognise that there is a plurality of values that cannot be weighed against each 
other as they are incommensurable values. If this were the case, there is no chance to 
38 
 
 
give priority to one over the other; it would require having an account of each value to be 
used to support the moral obligation to reduce inequalities. In other words, it would 
require that a possible action to reduce non-inequitable health inequalities would be 
deemed a moral duty on grounds of solidarity or beneficence, albeit not in justice.  
Yet, a problem emerges when competing alternative actions to reduce health inequalities 
are to be valued, if some of the possible actions are justified on justice grounds—for 
reducing health inequities—and the alternative actions are justified on beneficence or 
solidarity grounds—to reduce non-inequitable inequalities. It might be argued that justice 
always acts as a trump value that always overrides the other values; however, it is a fact 
that many times this is clearly not true. For instance, using resources in expensive 
treatments for elderly people with chronic terminal disease—that will not increase 
significantly their life expectancy— instead of using such resources for correcting 
inequities in access to healthcare for low-income people.  
The second way to justify a moral obligation to reduce health inequalities not deemed as 
unjust is to do so by appealing to justice, not directly, but indirectly through solidarity and 
beneficence. For doing this, it is required to have an ‘inclusive’ conception of justice that 
includes other values such as solidarity or beneficence. This idea is compatible with 
Aristotle’s distinction between the idea of something being just and being equitable 
(Aristotle, 1934 V.10). According to Aristotle, both concepts are the same (substance) but 
the latter is a better form of the previous. What is implicit in this formulation is the idea 
of movement or change, where justice moves to achieve all its potential. Within this 
account, solidarity and beneficence would not be competing values but part of the 
complete form of justice, helping to improve the actual form of justice.     
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In summary, we might argue that health inequalities are a matter of justice; and if so, 
there will be a moral duty to alleviate health inequalities—even those that are deemed 
non-inequitable inequalities. However, to justify such a conception of justice we have to 
appeal to a broader and more inclusive sense of the concept of justice than that usually 
employed; one in which justice is not only invoked in a narrow sense to correct something 
unjust, but used in a broader sense that includes other positive values, namely solidarity, 
beneficence and the like. How can we approach this broader conception of justice we 
require to justify seeking to reduce health inequalities? 
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3. Health Inequalities and Justice 
 
3.1. Justice and Distributive Justice 
I shall start my approach to a broader conception of justice recalling that it is usual to 
divide justice into several—sometimes overlapping—types, such as Distributive Justice 
(fair distribution of benefits, resources, opportunities, advantages, responsibilities and 
burdens resulting from social life), Commutative Justice (fair accomplishment of 
agreements),  Retributive Justice  (fair rectification of wrongs), Procedural Justice (fair 
process resolving disputes or allocating resources), etc. (Buchanan & Mathieu, 1986).  
The ‘health inequalities’ problem is usually analysed from the point of view of distributive 
justice, so the accounts developed to inform actions regarding health are mainly looking 
for the fair distribution of health or health-related things. However, if we were to assert 
that health is something belonging to individuals, then it may also be a matter of either 
commutative justice or retributive justice. An example of health as a matter of 
commutative justice would be the agreement of some workers to put themselves at risk 
of illness through their work or directly doing something that may result in deterioration 
to their health status. What is a just agreement when health is part of the ‘transactional 
costs’? Similarly, when detriment to health is the outcome of someone else’s action, 
certainly he/she should repair or rectify it, providing the resources for healthcare or 
compensating for that loss of health with other goods, for instance. However, what is a 
just compensation for damage to one’s health?  
Should we have different theories of justice in health for each type of justice, then? 
Namely ‘theory of distributive justice in health’, ‘theory of commutative justice in health’, 
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‘theory of retributive justice in health’, etc. In fact, I do not wish to support such an idea. 
What I want to emphasize is that health is a matter for justice in general, not only for 
distributive justice.   
Certainly, the kind of questions emerging from commutative or retributive problems 
related to health may well receive an answer through an appeal to some criteria of 
distributive justice. It might be argued that a just agreement should give the worker an 
equal or higher level of opportunities, or perhaps that a just compensation for health 
damages would return the damaged party to the same or a higher level of opportunities 
than that before the damage.  
For if we are to consider health as being somehow special, even though we apply 
distributive criteria to commutative or retributive situations, these situations remain 
special cases that require further attention. Even so, we shall recognize that a large part 
of health inequalities are the consequence of some kind of distribution, so it seems a 
good strategy for working towards an account of justice for health inequalities to think in 
terms of distributive justice as a starting point. However, we have to bear in mind that 
this is part of our strategy to find a broader account of justice, able to deal with 
distributive as much as retributive and commutative claims—in the same way it is able to 
justify aiming at reducing health inequalities even those that are not inequities.  
 
3.2. Distribution of what? 
Distributive justice is concerned with the fair distribution of those things that particular 
individuals are to share (Finnis, 1979 p.166). According to Rawls, the main task of 
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distributive justice is the choice of the social arrangement that constitute the basic 
structures of society. The principles of justice as fairness applied to these basic structures 
use the notion of pure procedural justice to deal with particular contingences (Rawls, 
1971 p.274). This means that, whatever the outcome of a distribution might be, it is just if 
the social arrangement (‘the procedure’) is fair (p.83)— as far inequalities are to the 
greatest expected benefit of the least advantaged and attached to fair equality of 
opportunities. Moreover, it would imply—if distributive justice’s locus is not the outcome, 
but the process of distribution—that the health determinants are the proper subject 
matter for distributive justice, rather than health itself.  
However, if our concern is with the distribution of health as an outcome, pure procedural 
accounts of justice —such as Rawls’ one— may not be the right account to justify 
reducing health inequalities. In that case, the account that we seek might be either a 
‘pure outcomes’ approach (only the outcome matters), or a sort of ‘mixed’ account where 
both procedure and outcomes matter.  
Whatever we choose, setting an account where outcomes matter requires defining what 
particular outcomes are to be deemed just outcomes. So, at this point it is worth saying 
that some special characteristics of health make it more difficult to set the parameters for 
defining a just distribution of outcomes in relation to health. First, the health of 
individuals is not the product of a simple acquisition or transfer from a hypothetical 
common share. It is not possible to distribute health as we distribute, for example, a cake. 
Multiple factors determine health —genetics, environment, social factors, or the like; so, 
there is not a direct relationship between what it is possible to distribute directly through 
an action performed with the intention of ensuring a just distribution of health outcomes, 
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and the outcome that is, in fact, finally obtained. Neither, is it possible to re-distribute 
health to correct inequities in health ―for instance, taking health from a very healthy 
person and giving it to a very unhealthy one (Wilson, 2011).  
Second, health is more than just the absence of illness. Consider for example, a healthy 
person who reads in a newspaper that walking 30 minutes every day could raise one’s 
‘sexual performance’. We cannot say that by initiating this daily routine, this person goes 
from illness to a healthy state, but maybe from a healthy state to a healthier one. 
Therefore, health is not just one of two alternatives in a health/illness dichotomy. 
Similarly, health does not exclude illness. Sometimes, people who have a disease are 
otherwise healthy ―for instance, people who use glasses. If health and illness do not 
completely exclude each other, then the distribution of health does not necessarily mirror 
the distribution of illness, which is the way we usually measure health distribution—
through morbidity rates, DALYs, and so on.  
Finally, health has an intrinsic as much as an extrinsic value. Most accounts of health 
distribution focus on extrinsic value. For example, Daniels’ account places a special value 
on health insofar ―through health protection― we are protecting the normal range of 
opportunities open to individuals (Daniels, 2008). The same can be seen in Sen’s account, 
where health is valued because it is ‘a critically significant constituent of human 
capabilities which we have reason to value’ (Sen, 2006 p.22). I am not claiming that no 
intrinsic value is assigned to health in such accounts, but it does seem that the extrinsic 
value of health is more important for them.  
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To relate inequalities in health to justice, especially if we are looking for a framework for 
justifying health-related interventions—namely, allocating resources to health care, 
promoting health or preventing illness—and not-health-related interventions, it is usual 
to begin by drawing upon some general theory of justice.  
Daniels, for instance, develops his account of justice in health by extending Rawls’s 
Theory of Justice to justify our concern about health. His claim is that in protecting health 
we are protecting the normal range of opportunities open to individuals (Daniels, 2008 
p.30). Such a normal range of opportunities is ‘the array of life plans reasonable persons 
are likely to develop for themselves’ (p.43). Daniels suggests integrating health (indirectly) 
into Rawls’s index of primary goods by considering health-care institutions as social basic 
institutions aimed at providing equality of opportunity. However, he states that 
opportunity, not health care is the primary good (p.57). 
Founding the importance of health in the opportunities it provides is contentious. Even 
drawing upon Rawls’ theory as Daniels does, some other authors do not link the moral 
importance of health inequities to opportunities; instead, they prefer to include health 
directly within the list of primary goods (Veatch, 1989). Others, in contrast, prefer 
justifying the concern about health inequities just insofar as they are evidence of unfair 
basic institutions (Peter, 2001). 
In a broader debate about justice, the different possible ‘currencies of justice’ (Cohen, 
1989) expand the range of options beyond the boundaries of Rawls’ theory. For example, 
the Egalitarian may justify reducing health inequalities either on the basis of the equality 
of welfare—as the satisfaction of preferences, goals and ambitions, or the fulfilment of 
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some sort of agreeable quality of conscious life (Dworkin, 1981a)—, the equality of basic 
capabilities—the abilities to do certain basic things (Sen, 1980)—, or the equality of 
resources (Dworkin, 1981b).  It is also possible to expand the scope beyond 
egalitarianism, and justify reducing health inequities, for instance, on grounds of 
utilitarianism as it benefits the overall utility, either because inequities affect everyone or 
because interventions to reduce health inequities within a population are cost-effective 
(Beauchamp & Childress, 2001; Woodward & Kawachi, 2000). 
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‘What are you waiting for? You're faster than this.  
Don't think you are, know you are’. 
Morpheus (The Matrix) 
 
3.3. Can Rawls’ account justify seeking to reduce health inequalities? 
I said previously that Daniels aims at extending Rawls’ theory of justice to justify our 
moral concern about the distribution of health. Nevertheless, we should be aware that 
Rawls’ purpose is not to provide a moral justification to decide which goods are to be 
distributed under the rule of the principles of justice. Instead, Rawls proposes such 
principles for assessing and ‘choosing among the various social arrangements which 
determine this division of advantages and for underwriting an agreement on the proper 
distributive shares’ (Rawls, 1971 p.4).  
Rawls claims the ‘priority of justice’ to any conception of the good. As a political 
conception—not religious, not philosophical, not moral—Rawls’ Justice as Fairness cannot 
contain any comprehensive conception of the good (Rawls, 1985). Moreover, any possible 
conception of the good should be a ‘thin theory of good’ that does not challenge the 
priority of justice (Rawls, 1971 p.396). However, justice’s priority does not mean that the 
conception of the good is not important. On the contrary, for the theory of Justice as 
Fairness the conceptions of good that people as citizens can pursue are significant. 
‘Priority of justice’ means that justice sets beforehand the limits of the shared space such 
conceptions of the good will develop. A shared idea of the good is only possible for 
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political purposes, and this must avoid any particular comprehensive doctrine as its 
foundation (Rawls, 1988).  
The possible conceptions of good allowed by the Theory of Justice as Fairness include the 
idea of Goodness as Rationality—which Rawls takes for granted in any political 
conception of justice. Such an idea ‘must count human life and the fulfilment of basic 
human needs and purposes as in general good’ (Rawls, 1988 p.254). Goodness as 
rationality gives the framework for the account of primary goods, which are ‘things that 
citizens need as free and equal persons’ (p.257). This account aims at defining the kind of 
claims the citizen can make, and the framework for assessing and supporting those 
claims.  
Health would seem to fit within the idea of a primary good in Rawls’ theory; however, it 
was not included in his list of primary goods. The reason for this is that health is a good 
not completely under the control of basic structures; so, it cannot be included on the list 
of primary goods. The list of primary goods aims at having a ‘practicable public basis of 
interpersonal comparisons’ (Rawls, 1993 p.181), to evaluate the best social arrangement 
under the principles of justice as fairness; so such a list is not the end of the social 
arrangement, but a means to deciding among alternative social arrangements. 
Independently of the reasons Rawls had for ruling out health, we should admit that —
under the assumptions of the idea of goodness as rationality— any particular conception 
of good ought to recognize health as a human basic need. If this were true, health needs 
would be not only appropriate claims to weight under the terms of a liberal social 
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agreement, but also constitute part of the idea of goodness that any political conception 
of justice contains.  
Any (liberal) political system, as far as it promotes the fulfilment of basic human needs, 
should recognize health as a good to fulfil.  The importance of protecting health as a good 
that any rational being pursues does not necessarily imply that there is a duty to equalize 
health between all individuals. Effectively, any political conception ought to agree on 
pursuing the health of citizens, as a rational duty of the political system ―as is the case, 
for instance, of the utilitarian conception. 
For if we agree that the basic structures influence health by means of what we now call 
the social determinants of health, then health is only indirectly linked to Rawls’ principles 
of justice, insofar as these principles apply only to the basic social structures, and such 
structures are not completely responsible for health distribution. This idea is also present 
when Daniels says, ‘health inequality is an inequity if it is the result of an unjust 
distribution of the socially controllable factors affecting population health and its 
distribution’ (Daniels, 2008 p.101). A just distribution of the social determinants of health 
―according to Daniels― would and should be regulated under Rawls’ principles of justice 
as fairness. The residual inequalities, those emerging even when social determinants 
satisfy the principles of justice as fairness, are acceptable as just.   
Now, consider that Peter was right when she says, ‘If the basic structure is just, then all 
outcomes these institutions produce can be considered as just’ (Peter, 2001 p102). Also 
consider there were other goods whose distribution represents more truthfully the fair 
functioning of basic structures of society (in fact there are such goods—income 
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distribution, for instance). Does this mean that it is the distribution of social 
determinants, not the distribution of health, which should be the focus of justice as 
fairness? Or should we stop being concerned about health distribution, and focus only on 
the goods that represent better the functioning social arrangement?  My answer is no to 
both questions. We should keep our moral concern about health distribution, not 
because a just health distribution represents a just social arrangement or that it is 
important for equalizing opportunities. Our concern about a just distribution of health 
derives from recognizing health as part of the good everybody in a just society must be 
allowed to pursue and fairly realise. 
We can conclude this part by agreeing with Daniels about the idea that Rawls’ Theory of 
Justice can justify seeking to reduce health inequalities, but do so from a different 
approach. Health’s importance surpasses the idea of protection of the normal range of 
opportunities open to individuals, because health is not only an instrument for 
individuals’ pursuit of their own good, but is also part of this good itself; a good that any 
social arrangement should aim at fulfilling. Founding our concern about health 
distribution upon the recognition of health as a human basic need is a better way to 
justify actions seeking to reduce health inequalities.  
 
3.4. The requirement of a conception of good 
Up to now, I have argued that inequalities in health are a matter of justice; therefore, 
there is a moral duty to alleviate such inequalities. However, an account to justify actions 
seeking to reduce health inequalities should consider the concept of justice in a broader 
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and more comprehensive sense than usual. Such a concept must embrace the possibility 
of change from a just arrangement to a more equitable one, through the inclusion of 
other values such as solidarity and beneficence as part of the concept. In this way, 
pursuing an equitable health distribution includes the reduction of inequalities deemed 
unjust as well as those considered non-inequitable inequalities.   
I also argued that any political conception of justice ought to agree on the concern about 
the health of citizens as a rational duty of the political system, as far as such conceptions 
should count the fulfilment of basic human needs—including health— as part of the 
general good to be pursued.  
In the same way, I want to suggest now that any political conception of justice would be 
unable to account for what the fulfilment of health needs means—at least, if we agree 
with Rawls about the impossibility of a just social arrangement that contains a 
comprehensive idea of the good. On the contrary, if we agree—and I certainly do— with 
the idea of health as some kind of state related to the wellbeing of a person and not only 
the absence of disease, and this state is part of the general good any political system 
should pursue; then, a just distribution of health has much more to do with the fulfilment 
of health needs than with the procedure of such distribution—even if all the social 
determinants of health could be controlled by a fair social arrangement.  
In other words, the justification of aiming to reduce health inequalities requires a 
conception of justice broad enough to include the idea of what a good society wants for 
the people who live within it, and what this good means in terms of health. This seems 
like an idea that timidly emerges when Daniels suggests the use of a thinner veil of 
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ignorance when selecting (fair) principles to govern health-care resource-allocation 
decisions, because we must know some features of the society, like resource limitations 
(Daniels, 2008 p.61). The idea of a thinner veil of ignorance openly departs from Rawls’ 
original theory. On this, the veil of ignorance was conceived as a central constrain to 
‘nullify the effects of specific contingencies’ (Rawls, 1971 p.136) making it possible to 
construct ‘the unanimous choice of a particular conception of justice’ (p.140). On the 
contrary, what Daniels is inviting us to do is to let the specific contingencies interfere with 
the selection of such principles.   
Is it wrong to ‘thin’ the veil of ignorance in the way Daniel suggests? I think it is not. What 
this idea demonstrates is that complete ignorance about the way that the society values 
the goods at stake when choosing the principles for the institutions is what is wrong—at 
least when dealing with more concrete situations. To explain this conclusion we should 
remember that what Daniel implies is that we require the knowledge of society’s 
resources to provide fair equality of opportunities, and this would require a lower level of 
abstraction as part of the veil of ignorance.  Additionally, Daniels states that the defence 
of this device depends on the underlying theory of the person, which in this case should 
not be persons defined by a particular set of interests, but free and equal moral agents 
who may revise their life plans (2008 p.61).  
If we were to agree to apply a less abstract veil of ignorance when we deal with more 
concrete situations such as the principles to govern health-care resource-allocation 
decisions, we could apply the same criteria in setting an account to justify seeking to 
reduce health inequalities. In such a case we might find two relevant issues behind the 
veil. First, knowing the resources available for health related decisions is just part of the 
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information required, because we also need to know the magnitude of the problem—
either inequalities of opportunities (for Daniels) or inequalities in health (in general). 
There is a significant difference between having a limited amount of resource when 
inequalities are huge than when they are small.  
The second issue is certainly more contentious; it is to know what means ‘health’ for the 
institution whose principles we are to define. Again, the answers will be very different if 
health is understood as only related to the absence of medical conditions or as a 
complete state of wellbeing (WHO, 1946). But even if it is not possible to agree to a 
specific definition of health, at least there is an agreement—as we said before—on 
understanding health as a basic human need whose fulfilment is part of the general good 
any social agreement should pursue.  If this were true, what we have is the requirement 
of such a thinner veil that allows knowing what ‘good’ means for society. Only if this were 
the case, it would be really possible to define the set of principles for equitable decisions 
seeking to reduce health inequalities. 
Finally, we can so far conclude that health inequalities represent inequalities of the good 
a society pursues for the people who live within it, and this is why justice justifies seeking 
a reduction in such inequalities. To do so, justice must be a broader concept that justifies 
the change to a more equitable state of affairs and is sustained by a conception intimately 
linked to the conception of good. 
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Part II: A Justice Account to Inform Health Policies 
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4. Which concept of justice? 
 
My argument from the previous chapter can be resumed as follows: there are some 
inequalities in health that qualify as inequities and other inequalities that do not. 
Inequalities that qualify as inequities are those that can be deemed to be unjust or rooted 
from some form of injustice, so it is clear that it is justice which justifies reducing such 
inequalities. Conversely, inequalities in health that do not qualify as inequities are, for 
instance, those that represent unequal outcomes in health due either to biological 
variations or to free chosen behaviours. It is reasonable to conceive that it is morally 
justifiable to seek to reduce some of these inequalities, but such a moral justification is 
usually ascribed to other principles such as beneficence or solidarity.  
However, a problem emerges when it is required to decide among competing courses of 
action, for example in allocating resources, and it entails choosing either the justice-
backed course (to reduce some health inequity) or the beneficence/solidarity-backed one 
(to reduce an inequality not deemed inequity). As to solve this problem, i.e. if allocating 
resources to reduce inequities or to reduce not-inequities, requires itself an account of 
justice, I concluded that it is justice what justifies reducing both inequities and not-
inequities.  
In other words, I argued that aiming at reducing health inequalities is grounded on justice, 
and this must not be understood only in the ‘negative’ sense that derives in reducing 
health inequalities that are deemed unjust, i.e. those that constitute health inequities. On 
the contrary, justice is the right foundation to explain why we decide to go further 
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reducing health inequalities—even though they do not constitute inequities. This sort of 
‘positive’ sense of justice requires a more comprehensive concept of justice able to 
account also for beneficence, solidarity and the like. This is the subject matter of the 
present chapter.  
 
4.1. The concept and the conceptions of Justice  
It has been said that the concept of justice could be fulfilled by various alternative 
conceptions, so the concept is what is generally agreed about the ‘idea’—i.e. the object of 
our understanding (Locke, 1975)—of what justice is, whereas the conception represents a 
less abstract level of the idea of justice which contains its specifications and may take 
various and sometimes conflicting forms (Dworkin, 1977 pp.134-6).  If I were to follow 
this classical distinction, perhaps I should say that what I am searching is a conception of 
justice comprehensive enough. Nevertheless, I said before that what I require is a 
comprehensive concept of justice, so I must begin by clarifying why I prefer using 
‘concept’ instead of ‘conception’. The importance of this is firstly trying to leave behind 
this, in my opinion, rather confusing divide between concept and conception of justice; 
and secondly, facilitating the task of extending the boundaries of our understanding of 
justice that I see constrained by this distinction.  
For instance, Rawls conceived the concept of justice as the (first) virtue of social 
institutions by which, on one hand, such institutions do not make arbitrary distinctions 
between persons when assigning basic rights and duties, and, on the other hand, social 
rules determine a proper balance between competing claims to the advantages of social 
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life. Such a concept remains open to competing ideas of what will differentiate an 
arbitrary from a non-arbitrary distinction, and what will determine the properness of a 
determined balance between claims. Rawls proposed that a set of principles—the 
‘Principles of Justice’— is required to fill in this gap. Such principles define the basic terms 
of the social agreement, so they are to be accepted by all that have their particular 
conceptions about what is required in determining the division of advantages and the 
proper distribution of shares. Therefore, the object of the agreement is a ‘shared’ 
conception of justice specified by the Principles of Justice. (Rawls, 1971 pp.3-6).  
However, what Rawls takes for granted as the concept of justice is not the only 
formulation of a concept of justice that has been proposed; there are alternative 
formulae intending to fulfil a more general and abstract idea of what justice is. For 
instance, if we are to consider the concept of justice as ‘treating like cases as like, and 
different cases differently’, what we are to fill in —i.e. what is to be settled as the 
conception of justice— is the specific idea regarding the relevant similarities and 
differences that make the cases alike or not alike. In these terms, what Rawls refers to as 
a ‘concept’ of justice would be just one alternative ‘conception’ of justice (Waldron, 2003 
p.270). Therefore, what we refer as a Rawlsian conception of justice is not only the 
principles Rawls arrived at, but the whole idea of justice as a virtue of principled social 
institutions. (It may be said, for example, as an alternative conception to Rawls’, that 
justice is an individual’s virtue). 
To understand the divide between concept/conception which now may appear hard to 
follow,   it is possible to say, as H.L.A. Hart does, that the idea of justice has a structure 
consisting in two parts: a constant part —‘Treat like cases alike’— and a varying part 
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which establishes the criterion to use in determining when cases are alike or different 
(Hart, 1963 p.viii; 1994 p.160;). Nonetheless, this seems to be reducing the idea of Justice 
to the result of a formula like the following one (being J: Justice, K: a constant (‘treat like 
cases alike’) and α: a variable part): 
J = K + α 
In this way, the ‘concept’—as a more abstract idea of what is justice— would be 
equivalent to the constant part; meanwhile, the ‘conception’ would include both the 
constant and the variable parts. Seen in this way, the concept of justice is necessarily 
incomplete, and it follows that the more abstract idea of justice risks to be useless; that is 
to say, it might be more difficult to find out a more useful idea of justice if it were not 
concretely specified (Dworkin, 1998 p74). Thus, thinking about justice as this ‘two part 
structure’ leads more to look after the specifications of justice—the task of setting α— 
than to the idea of justice itself (which should be the case when different theories of 
justice are at stake).  
Moreover, if the debate about alternative accounts of justice requires a certain level of 
specification to make them ‘useful’—for the purpose of guiding our decisions— then, 
such a level of specification entails a proportional level of restraint through the use of a 
determined conception of justice. That is the case of, for example, Rawls’s conception of 
justice —‘justice as fairness’—which is intended as a conception that applies only to 
political institutions of constitutional democracies (Rawls, 1985).  
Nevertheless, there is an alternative approach to understanding the compound structure 
of the idea of justice proposed by Hart. It is that the constant element of the idea of 
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justice is its formal part, and the varying element is its material part (Hart, 1963 p.vii). 
Derived from this, the formula ‘treat like cases as like, and different cases differently’ is 
often labeled as the ‘formal principle of justice’ (Buchanan & Mathieu, 1986 p.15).7 
Interestedly, it has also been said that, for Aristotle, justice is a concept compounded of a 
formal part, and a material part (Hart, 1963 p.vii). So, in Aristotelian terms, it should be 
said that justice is a hylomorphic compound. The important thing that I want to rescue 
from this proposition is that hylomorphic compounds are ‘produced’ when the form is put 
into the matter (Aristotle, 2008 Z.8, 1033a30-b9). If this were the case, the concept of 
justice should be understood as a thing that is a result that is produced.  
Suppose now that we name the process of producing a concept as a ‘process of 
conceiving’ —which is the meaning of conceptio, the Latin root of the word ‘conception’ 
(Merriam Webster, 2009). In that case, the outcome of such a ‘process of conceiving’ 
should be a conceptum —the Latin root of the word ‘concept’—which means ‘that which 
is conceived’. Following this rationale, we might draw the conclusion that different 
conceptions of justice are neither ‘more concrete’ alternatives to represent the ‘more 
abstract’ concept of justice, nor alternative ‘complements’ for the concept of justice, but 
alternative ways of ‘producing’ (conceiving) the concept of justice.   
If justice is seen in this way, it becomes clearer why alternative ‘conceptions’ of justice 
look like stemmed in alternative ‘concepts’ of justice.  For instance, the concept of justice 
that utilitarians have in mind when they think that it is just to take a property without an 
                                                     
7 Such a principle is said to emerge in Aristotle’s work, specifically in Ethics ‘*…+ there will be the same 
equality between the shares as between the persons, since the ratio between the shares will be equal  to 
the ratio between the persons; for if the persons are not equal, they will not have equal shares*…+’. 
(Aristotle, 1934: V.iii.6), and in Politics ‘*...+ those who are by nature equals must have the same natural 
right and worth, and that for unequals to have an equal share*...+’  (Aristotle 2004: III, c16§2), 
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owner’s consent if this contribute to the greatest sum of happiness seems to be exactly 
the opposite to the concept that libertarians have in mind as they think that it is unjust to 
take a property without an owner’s consent. The conclusion might be that appealing to a 
divide between a concept and conceptions of justice is worthless when it is taken into 
account that the resulting (concept) of such process of conceiving (conception) justice will 
depend not only upon what are the concrete specifications of justice but also in how the 
process is carried out.  
Such a process of conceiving justice will in turn depend on which I might call ‘accidental 
elements’, i.e. those elements that give the essence its actual form, such as the subjects it 
applies to, or the culture or believes prevailing in a determined place or time. In doing so, 
what I want to recognize is the fact that the concept of justice encloses the idea of 
movement.  
4.2. The concept of Justice as an action 
As the form, according to Aristotle, is the ‘essence of each thing, and its primary 
substance’ (Aristotle, 2008:1032b1), it is possible to derive a second conclusion from the 
idea of justice as a hylomorphic compound; this is that the concept of justice is essentially 
its form. If we were to take, for instance, ‘treat like cases as like, and different cases 
differently’ as justice’s form, then we could say that the concept of justice has essentially 
the form of an action. We could obtain a similar conclusion if we were to use an 
alternative formal idea for justice, such as the one Plato attributed to Simonides ‘to give 
what is owed to each is justice’ (Plato & Griffith, 2003 p.5). In other words, in both cases 
justice, as a concept, might be considered the result of an action—as it is conceived—, 
but simultaneously an action itself, for it has the form of an action.  
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Nevertheless, it is more frequent to find justice considered as a virtue rather than as an 
action. As I mentioned before, for example, Rawls’ concept of justice is that it is the (first) 
virtue of social institutions; and this is a widespread idea that is present since Aristotle’s 
Politics ‘[...] justice has been acknowledged by us to be a social virtue [...]’ (Aristotle, 1905 
III.xiii.3).  
I must go into discussing justice as a virtue in depth later, for what I must do first is to 
explore the idea of justice as action, and then explore how ‘justice as an action’ can be 
related to ‘justice as a virtue’. For doing so, I would like to use Pogge’s taxonomy of the 
concept of justice (Pogge, 2004 pp.141-145), though in a different way than he does. 
According to him, the concept of justice is a ‘predicate’—i.e. it is something ‘said’ about 
something else. It is possible to apply it to four kinds of ‘subjects’8:  to persons (individuals 
or groups), to conducts (acts or omissions), to social rules, and to other states of affairs. 
For these potential subjects, the concept of justice can function as a one-, two-, three- or 
four- places predicate. The first case, refers to justice when said about one subject (any of 
the above mentioned); however ‘just’ is more often said about one subject A towards a 
recipient B (two-places predicate), and it is even more frequently said that A is just (or 
unjust) towards B regarding C (three-places predicate) —the latter being the one Pogge 
considers the more fundamental use. However, he adds a fourth place D—which he calls 
the agent— who has or shares the moral responsibility for the justice or injustice of the 
                                                     
8 Pogge uses the word judicandum to refer to what is said to be just or unjust; however this might be 
confusing, even though his translation of the word as ‘that which is to be judged’ might be deemed right;  
for this word applies primarily to the person who faces a trial, not the judge in the trial. The judge can be 
said just or unjust when become a judicandum under trial, but then he is not acting as judge. To avoid this 
potential source of confusion, I replaced the word judicandum for ‘subject’ which Pogge uses regarding to 
persons and groups, but I intend to use as ‘that of which a quality, attribute, or relation may be affirmed or 
in which it may inhere’ (Merriam-Webster) —i.e. that of which ‘just’ might be predicated. 
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subject. This allows him to differentiate a passive concept of justice —the three-places 
predicate— which emphasizes the recipient’s point of view, from an active concept of 
justice —the four-places predicate— which emphasizes the agent’s point of view. 
Interestedly, what Pogge aims to do is to move away from the idea that the concern of 
justice is ‘simply’ related to the impact for the recipients—’to be just is to promote a good 
distribution’ (p.146) — to the concern about the relation between agent(s) and 
recipient(s) —’to be just is to give equitable treatment’ (p.146).  
Drawing upon Pogge’s ideas outlined above, it is possible to say firstly that implicit in the 
idea of A being just towards B regarding C is that there is an act (either action or 
omission) of A towards B; and this is exemplified in the use of verbs such as ‘to promote’ 
(a good distribution), or ‘to treat’ (equitably the recipients). By adding D to his account of 
the concept of justice Pogge is emphasizing the relevance of acts where there is an agent 
who is morally responsible for such an act. Through this, what he is making relevant is not 
only the relational character of justice, but also the important role of the agent when the 
act which relates A towards B regarding C, is to be assessed as just or unjust.  
It is important to note that in Pogge’s account, an agent is whoever holds or shares moral 
responsibility in the way A relates to B regarding C. This adds an important level of 
complexity to the analysis by extending the assessment of justice to include all relevant 
share-holders of responsibility. So, when we assert that the consequences of Katrina were 
unjust, we make a claim in relation to the Government’s responsibility to prevent the 
consequences, not because Katrina acted unjustly. However, if we were to recognize that 
what relates A to B has the form of an action, whatever the action, there is always 
something or someone who performs such an action.  As in its more general use, ‘agent’ 
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refers to ‘something that produces or is capable of producing an effect’ (Merriam-
Webster 2009); we might regard that as A produces or is capable of producing an effect 
toward B regarding C— thus, we should count A as an agent. Nevertheless, even though A 
produces or is capable of producing an effect toward B regarding C, this does not 
necessarily imply that A is ‘morally responsible’ for such action; for it is possible to split 
the responsibility for producing an effect from the moral significance we are assigning to 
the responsibility to address the consequences. In our example of hurricane Katrina, we 
might say that Katrina is responsible for the effects it caused to New Orleans’ citizens, but 
it is absurd to say that it is morally responsibly. However, as I said before, we could still 
say that the consequences of Katrina were unjust; but we do this because there is a 
Government to who we attribute the moral responsibility for preventing the hurricane’s 
consequences.  Such consequences for New Orleans’ citizens thus are not the outcome of 
the single action of the hurricane blowing over the city, but are also the effect of the 
omissions in preventing the possible damage from hurricanes.   
Thus, what is important to take from Pogge’s account is the need to identify the morally 
relevant action and thereby its agent. For the outcomes of Katrina the action of blowing 
winds is not the relevant action, but the actions (or omissions) of Government in the 
circumstances of Katrina. Therefore, the judgement is not about the relationship of 
Katrina as A towards B, but Government as A towards B (New Orleans’ citizens). 
Therefore, through the analysis just outlined we finally arrive at the idea that justice is 
something that we can predicate about different subjects; however it is primarily 
predicated upon the morally relevant actions that relate a morally responsible agent with 
the recipient(s), or affected by, such an action. 
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In saying that Justice is ‘primarily’ predicated upon actions, I mean that when we 
predicate justice upon subjects such as persons, social rules, or states of affairs, we are 
making reference—either implicitly or explicitly—to an actual or potential action 
involved. For it seems absurd to deem unjust a state of affairs that is neither the 
consequence, nor can be modified by the action of some morally responsible agent; 
similarly, one cannot deem a person unjust if it is not qua moral agent, i.e. someone who 
carries out an action which is susceptible to be deemed unjust. Moreover in the case of 
social rules, insofar they are intended to set the boundaries for the actions carried out by 
those who belong to the society that bears such rules.   
Note, however, that I am not implying that a judgment about how to deem the other 
subjects will depend of how the action related is deemed. I propose, instead, that the 
concept of justice rests upon the relations underlying actions upon which one may 
predicate justice. 
4.3. Justice predicated upon the moral agent: The concept of Justice as a 
virtue 
Thus, if predicating justice about the action involved not necessarily implies the way 
justice is predicated about the agent or the resulting state of affairs, we need to extend 
the concept of Justice as an action to account for these other subjects. 
Following our argument—that we can predicate that the moral agent A is just or unjust 
towards B regarding C—suppose that our moral agent is a teacher A that is marking the 
students’ essays, and he underscores B’s essay because B misbehaved during A’s lectures. 
We might deem this as an unjust action of A towards B regarding the essay’s mark. 
Moreover, we could deem the teacher as unjust according to this action, as B probably 
64 
 
 
does after learning his mark. However, a further analysis of the way this teacher mark 
students’ essays reveals that he almost always marks only according to the quality of the 
essays. Can we sustain still that teacher A is unjust?  Or, it was only a circumstantial 
failure of his otherwise being just? To give an answer to such questions requires us to 
respond a previous one: what are we saying when we say that an agent is just or unjust? 
As I see it, to say that someone is just is to say that he or she habitually carries out certain 
kind of actions—which constitutes a practice— that are deemed as just. And saying so, it 
is a virtue what we are attributing to him or to her. As practice provides the ground where 
virtue is exhibited (MacIntyre, 2007 p.187), the practice of just actions is indeed the way 
the virtue of justice is manifested. Certainly, it is possible to say that the practice of just 
actions does not necessarily is the expression of having the virtue of justice; and, in so 
saying, probably I require giving an account of what virtue is—for virtue is itself a 
contested concept. Moreover, if we are to extend the concept of justice to include its use 
as a predicate for actions as well as for moral agents, it seems to me that it is unavoidable 
to give some account of virtue. 
I shall begin by claiming that a virtue is a good quality of moral agents; by saying so, I 
mean that is something predicated of somebody that entails a positive moral value. I will 
not give an account for such a positive moral value here; so, let us accept for now that, at 
least, no virtue is regarded as an evil in any ethical theory.  
Secondly, this quality is related to action, but not to an action in particular but to a 
systematically repeated action, i.e. to a kind of activity or practice. This claim is retrieving 
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Aristotle again, who supported the idea that, roughly speaking, a virtue is formed as 
result of engaging in the corresponding activity9 (Aristotle, 1934 II.i.7).  
Focusing in justice as a virtue Aristotle claims that ‘we become just by doing just acts’ 
(II.i.5).  However, this relationship functions in the opposite sense, as well. For the virtue 
is exercised in full through just actions (II.ii.8); thus, whereas justice is formed through 
just acts, just acts are done because of justice. According to this two-ways relationship we 
might claim that the virtue of justice is either the resulting ‘habit’—as the settled 
tendency or usual manner of behaviour (Merriam Webster, 2009)— of doing just acts, or 
the ‘principle’ —as underlying faculty or endowment (Merriam Webster 2009)—which 
makes us to do just acts. For instance, if we were to apply the claim that the virtue of 
justice is either the resulting ‘habit’ or the ‘principle’ which makes us to do just acts to 
Rawls’ concept of justice, it should be said that justice is either the ‘habit’ of social 
institutions of doing just acts or the ‘principle’ which makes social institutions to act 
justly. 
Nevertheless, although the virtue of justice might be stated either as a habit or as a 
principle, what specifically is said is a contentious issue; for example, whether it consists 
on (a) having the disposition to act following the rules (of justice); or (b) having the ability 
to perform actions in a way that the resulting outcome is a state of affairs that can be 
deemed just; or having either (c)  the disposition to act as a virtuously just agent would 
act in the same circumstances (acting from virtue), or (d)the ability to act in the way a 
                                                     
9 Note that Aristotle is here referring to ‘moral’ virtues in opposition to ‘intellectual’ virtues which are not 
the product of activities but produced and increased by instruction (II.i.1). Insofar our interest is centred in 
justice which Aristotle counts as a ‘moral’ virtue, and not in developing a theory of virtues in general, we 
are taking only the moral virtues into account.  
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virtuously just agent would act given the same circumstances (acting virtuously) 1011.  
Bearing this in mind, let us use Rawls concept of virtue as a proxy to develop a more 
detailed account of virtue.  
Firstly, Rawls defines virtues as ‘sentiments, that is, related families of dispositions and 
propensities regulated by a higher-order desire’(Rawls, 1971 p.192) which in this case is 
the desire to act from the moral principle of right and justice (p.436). Secondly, Rawls 
claims that ‘the virtues are excellences’ (p.445), that is to say ‘characteristics and abilities 
of the person that it is rational for everyone (including ourselves) to want us to have..., 
the excellences are goods since they enable us to carry out a more satisfying plan of life 
enhancing our sense of mastery’ (p.443). Finally, Rawls encloses the virtue of justice into 
the psychological sphere, equating the virtue of justice with the sense of justice (p.479f). 
These three main ideas lead us, on one hand, to question if justice is appropriately stated 
as a virtue of social institutions, or at least to question if social institutions can possess a 
(psychological) sense of justice. On the other hand, the reduction of virtue to 
psychological trait detaches virtues from the good they might have themselves, leaving 
just the utility they produce through the disposition to obey the rules of morality—
something that Rawls shares with Hume, Kant and Mill (MacIntyre, 2007 pp.232-3)—that 
are to be set beforehand in an ‘original position’, and the persons behind the ‘veil of 
ignorance’ who set the rules must have ‘certain psychology’ (Rawls, 1971 p.121). Such 
psychology implies that they are capable of a ‘sense of justice’, which means that they 
‘can rely on each other to understand and to act in accordance with whatever principles 
                                                     
10 More discussion about this: (Driver, 1996) 
11 On the distinction between acting from virtue and acting virtuously see (Swanton, 2001). 
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are finally agreed...their capacity for a sense of justice insures that the principles chosen 
will be respected’ (p.145).  
Rawls’ account seems to correspond to the alternative (a) stated above regarding what 
the virtue of justice consists on: having the disposition to act following the rules (of 
justice). Such a disposition cannot, in this case, be taken as a synonym of habit, for Rawls 
is aiming at detaching justice as the resulting quality of a usual manner of behaviour from 
the justice as a principle according to which one perform just actions. This, I think, is 
because he thinks that it is only possible that a specific settled manner of acting might be 
deemed just if and only if it is performed according to the rules constitutive of the 
principle(s) of justice previously determined by people who possess the specific 
disposition to follow such rules; so that, such a specific settled manner of acting could not 
perfect the disposition in the original position without breaking down the idea that the 
virtue of justice is the disposition required in the original position. On this, Rawls’ account 
of Justice as a virtue can be counted as an example of a Kantian account of virtues, as the 
disposition above mentioned can be read as a trait of the goodness of an agent’s 
character who has internalized the capacity to test the universalizability of his/her 
maxims (Oakley, 1996), if we are to take the principles of justice as maxims for actions of 
social institutions aimed at distributing  basic rights and duties.   
Similarly, the emphasis that Rawls’ account puts on the ‘principle(s)’ of justice dismisses 
unnecessarily the importance that training and experience has in the development of 
virtue. To give an example of its importance, suppose a judge of the Supreme Court that 
has to decide about a very complex case for which there is no jurisprudence; it is not only 
that we value her ability to follow the rules of Law, or her impartiality, or even her ability 
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to decide putting herself in an ‘original position’ standpoint, for all those things could be 
perfectly the qualities of a good citizen; however we name her quality to decide in such a 
case as ‘virtue of justice’ because we recognize in saying so a quality that is not given by a 
psychological disposition but by the experience acquired through a certain practice of just 
actions that is exceptional among citizen; a knowledge learned not only in the theory but 
also in the practice. Paraphrasing Morpheus quoted at the beginning of this section —it is 
not her thinking of being just that matters but her knowing of being just. In other words, 
those who know how to be just do not need to think how to be just. 
On the other hand, a concept of the virtue of justice stated as in (b) above—‘having the 
ability to perform actions in a way that the resulting outcome is a state of affairs that can 
be deemed just’—would require, instead, introducing an evaluative account of the 
consequences of the actions commanded by the virtue of justice; and this could be said to 
represent a consequentialist concept of the virtue insofar it would be the consequences 
of the actions what determines whether the agent is just or not. Certainly, as Mill put it 
from the point  of view of utilitarianism—as a form of consequentialism— ‘a right action 
does not necessarily indicate a virtuous character’ (Mill, 1991 p.152), adding that 
considerations about the goodness of the agent are not relevant for estimation of actions, 
but of persons (p.151); so it might seems that virtues in such an account do not matter. 
However, forced to deem an agent as just or unjust, a utilitarian would need to appeal to 
the quality of been able to obtain just consequences from actions, i.e. to do just actions.  
The contrast between (a) and (b) regarding justice as a virtue become more clear if we 
think that a concept of Justice stated as the virtue of (only) having the disposition to act 
following the rules excludes the possibility of including as part of such a virtue the quality 
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of moral agents to go beyond the boundaries of the set of rules or even override such 
rules in pursuing a good. For instance, in such account the quality of a free rider who 
contributes to maximize the total utility by regularly not following the rules would never 
be named virtue; but for some utilitarian such a quality is a virtue. This does not imply 
that utilitarianism is right regarding what the virtue of justice is, but at least brings 
attention over the necessity of further discussion about the relationship between justice 
as a virtue and the goodness of the state of affairs resulting from such a virtue. And this 
not only refers to the problem of A being deemed just or not insofar is doing something 
that can be judged as good for B, but also whether A’s acting towards B should be good 
for A or not to be deemed as just; or even whether such an action must be good for the 
practice involved to judge A as being just.  
4.4. Justice as a State of Affairs  
From a utilitarian point of view, what counts as a virtue thus is derivative from the state 
of affairs that is consequence of A’s action towards B, so that such action contributes to 
the overall good. In this case it does not matter if the consequences of ‘being virtuous’ 
are good or not for A; in other words, a just A makes just actions towards B probed in turn 
that such actions contribute to the good for all B even if it is not good for A himself (Mill, 
1991 p.141). Nevertheless, as I see it, this presents at least two problems for a concept of 
justice that accounts for justice as a virtue. Firstly, it is contentious whether it is right not 
to count the motives and intentions for acting on a just way as part of the virtue of 
justice—a problem common to any consequentialist account; for someone who is known 
to be acting in such a way that its consequences produce just states of affairs might be 
motivated by looking after honours for himself and not by intending justice, hardly could 
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be deemed as having the virtue of justice. Secondly, it is also contentious the requirement 
of A’s neutrality for evaluating the consequences of his/her actions towards B, so that 
some action directed to a specific recipient must be weighed against the overall good 
produced, counting this recipient as one more of the whole recipients of the 
consequences of my actions. Thus, someone who shows preference for his own family 
even if with his action is actually diminishing the overall utility could not be regarded as 
having the virtue of justice which contrast with common sense of justice as giving 
something that is due. Sidgwick point it out in the same direction when states that the 
notions of Desert and Fitness conflict, as the latter —that he regards as a utilitarian 
principle of justice—limits the realization of what is the chief element of Ideal Justice: the 
Requital of Desert (Sidgwick, 1981 p.283); in other words, differentiating between a B 
who deserves the good produced by A’s actions and the whole that could benefit from an 
alternative course of action should be counted as part of the virtue of justice, even if this 
does not contribute to the overall utility.    
Nonetheless, it is not how consequentialism could account for justice as a virtue what is 
more problematic, but the fact that the only good that counts for such a virtue is the 
good for B (or the sum of all possible B); and as we said at the end of the previous section, 
it is also important to consider whether A’s acting towards B should be good for A; and 
whether such acting must be good for the practice involved. 
Opposed to the consequentialist point of view we might find those accounts of ‘virtue 
ethics’. As Oakley puts it (1996), virtue ethics bases its criterion of virtue not in the 
agent’s capacity to test the universalisability of maxims or its disposition to maximize 
goodness, but in the goodness the virtue represents for the agent, which can be 
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understood from either an eudemonistic point of view (the virtue is good for the agent to 
live a happy life); a perfectionist point of view (the virtue is good for the agent as it 
represents his/her essential properties as human beings); or an admiration-based point of 
view (the virtue is good for the agent as it represents traits we commonly find admirable).  
I will not discuss the differences between alternative ideas of the good for the agent that 
virtue represents; for, although these are important to distinguish among the several 
virtue ethics accounts, I think at this point it is more relevant to discuss how these are to 
account for the relationship between justice as a virtue and justice as an action. In 
relation to this, we can distinguish the alternatives (c) and (d) mentioned before, where 
justice as a virtue is respectively either the disposition to act as a virtuously just agent 
would act (in the same circumstances), or the ability (or capacity) to act in the way a 
virtuously just agent would act given the same circumstances. In both formulations the 
key factor of the virtue is the character of the agent, so that we can say that both 
represent ‘virtue ethical approaches’; however, the distinction between them is given by 
their different approach to the realization of justice through the action the virtue 
originates, so that the former could be labelled as ‘acting from the virtue’ and the latter as 
‘acting virtuously’.  
Thus, if justice is a disposition to act from the virtue of justice—i.e. disposing oneself by 
the practical wisdom (phronesis) to act as a virtuously just agent would act in the same 
circumstances— justice in the action and the resulting state of affairs will depend on how 
we deem such a disposition. Therefore, the outcome is important as far it is what a 
virtuous agent would intend according to his/her practical reason —‘the target’ according 
to Swanton (2001)—i.e. the potential outcome. If the outcome is not the expected, i.e. it 
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is not actualized—for example, due to external contingencies—this does not affect the 
fact that the outcome resulting from such an action—performed from the disposition to 
act as a virtuously just agent would act—should be deemed as just. This certainly recall 
Kant, in the sense that moral goodness only appears after having verified that the maxim 
of action can be made universal (Gonzalez, 2008); so that in this case justice will appear 
after verified a maxim which can be recognized universally as part of the virtue of justice. 
This is exemplified in Foot (Foot, 1985), who states that ‘justice is primarily concerned 
with the following of certain rules of fairness and honest dealing and with respecting 
prohibitions on interference with others rather with attachment to any end’.  
The alternative (d), acting virtuously, is more exigent regarding both the agent, and the 
resulting state of affairs—as it adds the necessity in the agent of developing the virtue of 
expediency (or effectiveness) as part of the virtue of justice, aside of the practical wisdom; 
for what is meant by acting virtuously, is having not only the disposition to act according 
to what is seen as the way a virtuous agent would act in a given circumstances, but also 
the ability to act in a way that the outcome is one that can be deemed as just 
independently of knowing or not the fact that the agent is actually virtuous. This 
alternative seems to me to be closer to an Aristotelian account of virtue; firstly, for he 
stated that the first motive of practical reason is realisable good (Aristotle, 1986 III,10), so 
that disposing oneself to act according to, for instance, certain rules of action that I know 
I am not able to realise should not be counted as a virtuous disposition. Secondly, as we 
mentioned above, for Aristotle ‘we become just by doing just acts’; so that the outcomes 
of our actions can be considered just, even if we are ‘in the way’ to become virtuous; and 
this means for the virtue of justice, that it is in the doing—the realization just actions—
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that the virtue is complete, and therefore, we can deem the agent as just. Additionally, 
this has much more to do with the understanding of virtues as realised through the 
practice, for is attending to the outcome that we can perfect our practices and become 
excellent in their execution, i.e. become virtuous.  
The alternative (d) is, therefore, the concept of the justice as a virtue that I will use in 
completing a more comprehensive concept of justice; although, to complete such a 
concept of, it is necessary to bring up the moral relevance of B and C under the scope of 
this enquiry. For the state of affairs produced by A’s action refers to B regarding C, it is 
not the same whether B and C are morally relevant or not; in other words, it is not the 
same distributing food (say peanuts) to the squirrels in the park than distributing food to 
children in the school, in the same way that is not the same distributing sweets to the 
patients in an hospital than distributing medicines to them. 
What I am now aiming at is to introduce the point of view of the recipient to give an 
account of what justice means; for it seems to me that if an action were deemed just 
from the point of view of the agent, but at the same time deemed unjust from the point 
of view of the recipient, then the concept of justice we were using would not be the 
correct one.  
This could be stated in a different way: from justice emerges—for a morally relevant B— 
the right to certain outcome when A acts towards her in regarding to a morally relevant C. 
It can be said, for example, that the patients that did not receive their medicines because 
the pharmacist was unable to carry out an action whose resulting state of affairs were 
deemed as just for them —i.e. independently of pharmacist’s having the disposition to act 
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justly—, can raise the claim that, although they were treated fairly12 by the pharmacist, 
their new state of affairs is not just, as they have the right to receive their treatment. 
Such rights, thus, are to be understood in this account as the expression of what the 
recipient deserves regarding the action performed by the agent, as well as the resulting 
state of affairs. 
Therefore, it is clear that a concept of justice is not complete if it does not give an account 
of rights; however, I will turn to rights as part of this account of justice later, for I must 
firstly clarify the role of goodness in regarding justice; because, we might think after what 
was said previously, that A being deemed just means something good for A (a virtue) that 
requires that her having the virtue, and acting accordingly, should be also judged as good 
for B, and likewise, good for the practice involved. 
 
4.5. Justice, Goodness and Beneficence 
Different ethical accounts have different approaches to the relationship between good 
and just. For example, Aristotle would claim that just actions, as any other kind of actions, 
are carried out intending some good (Aristotle, 1934 NE:1094a1). On the other hand, 
Rawls—even though he aims at detaching justice from the good—recognises that justice 
is something that any rational account of goodness should include as a good (Rawls, 
1988). According to Hursthouse (Hursthouse, 2006 p.100), a reductionist approach would 
say that deontology defines the good in terms of the right, whereas consequentialism 
                                                     
12 Here I use fairly meaning a deontological or non-consequentialist idea of justice; that is to say, following 
the rules of justice or disposing him/herself to follow such rules. 
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defines the right in terms of the good; and virtue ethics could be said defines both the 
right and the good in terms of the virtue—being the latter an impossible for Hursthouse.  
Where is the just, then? H.L.A. Hart stated that ‘just and unjust are more specific forms of 
moral criticism than good and bad or right and wrong’; (Hart 1994 p.158); following this, 
we could say that the just, is either a derivative from the right, or a derivative from the 
good, or even a derivative from both. As we are looking to delineate how justice and good 
are to be related, we could say now that there would be two possible strategies: either 
we derive the just from the good directly as we derive the right from the good, or we 
derive both the good and the just from the right; and it could be said that the former 
corresponds to a consequentialist approach, whereas the latter to a deontological one. 
Nevertheless, I think that both strategies are wrong as I agree with Hursthouse that such 
a kind of conclusions is too reductionist, for they treat to stand from a monistic concept 
from which all the other are to be derived; in the same way that I think that deriving the 
just from the virtue is wrong. The issue is much more complex; however, it is possible to 
advance that to extend the concept of justice we should take not a ‘derivative’ approach; 
instead, we should take one that captures such concepts as independent but interrelated. 
Such a complexity is maybe better represented in tragic dilemmas—at least better than 
my previous example of the pharmacist—as the one put forward in Sophie’s choice 
(Styron, 1992), where the protagonist was forced by a Nazi guard to decide which one of 
her children had to be killed and which one had to be saved, and if she does not decide 
both will be killed. Much might be said regarding to whether her decision was the right 
one or not, or whether her election maximized the good as she saved at least one from 
being killed, or even whether she acted as virtuous person would have acted in such a 
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situation; however, no one of these will change the conclusion that the outcome is unjust 
for the recipients of her decision, for both children have the right to live.  
It is not my objective to give a complete account of rights, but I have to point out that 
what I take for a right is, on the one hand, that that is owed by another, and on the other 
hand, the good to which a just action must intend; so that a right is to be understood as 
the object of justice, i.e. its realization. The problem that emerges with such a 
characterization is to elucidate what is the good that have to be intended; we might say 
that it is the good that is owed, but this answer falls into circularity. We might think that it 
is the good of overall utility as utilitarians do; but as we already mentioned, even Sidgwick 
recognizes that utility (‘fitness’) sometimes clash with what is just, and such an account 
hardly could recognise a right to something owed if utility mandates the contrary. A 
deontological account, in turn, falls apart from my characterization of rights, for in this 
account the acts of justice should not intend a good to be properly deemed as just, except 
for the good that derivates from acting according a universalized maxim.  
To make my point clearer, let us consider Socrates’ example of someone who borrowed a 
weapon from a friend who was perfectly sane but afterwards went mad and then asked 
for the weapons back (Plato, 1886, 331c). For a pure deontologist, giving back the 
weapon is the only possible alternative of action as maxims cannot accept exceptions, so 
that giving back the weapon is the right thing to do, and derivatively the just thing to do. 
In turn, a pure utilitarian would answer ‘it depends’ on how we are to count the 
contribution for the overall utility of each alternative (we could think, as some people do, 
that we can put him isolated to avoid harms for others, and then give him the weapon 
back if this makes him happier, for example).  
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However, I think that what we naturally do is to evaluate to what good each alternative is 
contributing, so that we might say that if we avoid giving back the weapon it will be good 
for his health and for the security of the people surrounding him—or as we usually say, 
their right to health and security— whereas giving back the weapon will be good, for 
instance, for his freedom—or his right to freedom.  Here is where we need to understand 
justice as a virtue, for it is our practical wisdom and our ability—developed through the 
practice of just actions—to choose which good (right) has precedence and which one has 
not, what will enable us to decide and to perform the just action in such circumstances. I 
have to make clear that this does not mean that each one should act according to his/her 
experience, as if experience were only the way to get the knowledge about the goodness 
on the ends of the actions; on the contrary, what the experience does is to help the 
practical reason to grasp the good in things that is its proper object.  
I must to recognize that I am standing closer to a Natural Law point of view of what is 
justice, of the kind found in Aquinas (Aquinas, 1947 II-IIae q57-58), which in turn roots on 
Aristotle’s account of the virtue of justice (Aristotle 1934, V). On this account, there is no 
contradiction or separateness between Justice and Benevolence; as when it is said that 
‘the special function of Benevolence begins where Justice ends’ (Sidgwick, 1981 p.242). 
On the contrary, following Aquinas we might say the distinction between both virtues 
corresponds to their ‘formal object’ (formalis obiecti) for the formal object of 
Benevolence is the good (Aquinas, 1947 IIª-IIae q31), whereas the formal object of Justice 
is what is owed (II-IIae q57-58). However, looking at the ‘material object’ (materialis 
obiecti), which is the same—the act performed—we realise that the actualization of a 
virtuous act of justice must consider Benevolence as well as a virtuous act of benevolence 
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must consider Justice; so that, nothing that is done intending the good of other can be 
unjust and nothing intending to render what is owed can be an evil for the other, as was 
made clear from Socrates’ example. Seen from the point of view of Justice, thus, 
Benevolence is a virtue that perfects Justice.  
It is worth to note that to ‘facilitate’ the understanding of the virtue of justice as a 
‘perfectible’ virtue, Aristotle in Ethics (V.10) introduced the concept of ‘Equity’ (Epieikeia), 
which is superior to justice but also the same that justice; so that, it is superior to the 
‘legal’ justice but the same that ‘ideal’ or ‘true’ justice. He exemplifies Equity in the man 
that is not stickler for his rights—and tends to take less than his share though he has the 
law in his side— although he did not explain why doing so would be better than taking 
the complete share. Aquinas supplement this explanation using Socrates’ example 
previously mentioned (II-IIae q120), saying that, as giving back the weapon would be 
cause of evil, not giving back the weapon is acting according to Equity; therefore, we can 
conclude that somebody that does not take his share is equitable iff this is intended for 
the good of others, although, in the same way we can conclude that someone who does 
not take his share and with this causes an evil to his family and benefit a rich man is not 
equitable. 
Through the discussion exposed, I have arrived to a concept of justice that I now can spell 
out as ‘the virtue of rendering each other the goods that are owed’, in other words ‘the 
virtue of rendering each other their rights’. 
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4.6. The role of community in defining the good we owe each other. The 
communitarian perspective  
Communitarianism arose as a reaction to liberal theory, particularly - but not exclusively - 
as a critique of Rawls and his neocontractualism, which assumes that the primary task of 
governments is to secure and distribute fairly liberties and economic resources that 
individuals need to lead freely their lives (Bell, 2001). 
Although there is a diversity of emphasis and nuance in the critiques of liberalism and the 
proposed alternatives, we can say that the main communitarian authors —Alasdair 
MacIntyre, Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor and Michael Walzer—have in common the 
place that they give to the good of the community as well as that of the individual, 
criticizing the human vision underpinning liberal thinkers, that insufficient attention is 
paid to the moral importance of the social fabric that binds human beings for their mutual 
benefit and care. Communitarians critique of liberalism also focuses on the liberal 
emphasis on individual rights without a corresponding emphasis on individual 
responsibilities to the rest of the community to which one belongs (Jennings , 2003) . 
Central to the critique of Rawls is that it gives precedence to the establishment of the 
principles of justice, on the basis of recognition of a ‘common good’ by the individuals 
performing the social contract. Sandel (1998) attributes this position to deontological 
liberalism's character - whose roots lie in the philosophy of Kant. A view that reaffirms the 
impossibility of imposing common standards based on a single criterion of purpose 
(telos), as the primacy of individual liberty must be respected, as each individual has their 
own conception of the good. The Communitarianism rejects the assumption that 
individuals can arrive at the principles of justice based on rationality and seeking to 
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ensure their individual interests autonomously, since the interests of the people are 
valued in terms of the conception of common good. Each individual person cannot 
bracket his convictions from his membership in a moral community that shapes his 
personal identity (Navarrete, 2006). Communitarianism seeks to articulate the concept of 
the common good, under which the concept of justice falls. The problem is what is the 
common good? 
Some communitarians argue that the definition of common good depends on the values 
shared by those who make up the community, and in that sense how justice is conceived 
may not be derived from an argument that seeks to be outlined separate from and prior 
to social life, as the aims and actions of individuals are determined by the history and 
culture of the community in which they live (Roberts and Reich, 2002). According to 
Michael Walzer (1983), justice depends on the value or meaning given to goods that are 
distributed, which depends on the cultural and historical context (the shared concept of 
good). So, commodities have a given identity by the way they are conceived, produced, 
transferred or consumed, which means that all goods have a social character. The 
principles are not dependent on distributional criteria of good in itself, but of their social 
identity, which is a ‘sphere of justice’. Consequently, the criteria used to distribute a 
good, do not necessarily coincide with the criteria used to distribute other goods. For 
example, if health care is distributed according to the needs of health, and income 
according to merit, we should not pretend to distribute health care according to merit or 
vice versa. Hence according to Walzer, justice is based on a complex equality between 
people. 
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It could be said that communitarian health equity would imply a shared definition as a 
society, reflecting our history and our shared values, allocating our resources —in the 
broadest sense of the word— to meet health needs under the shared idea of what we 
mean by health. However, there are other communitarians that suggest that there is one 
true good, and this is the good of the ‘ideal community’, from which they derive all the 
other virtues. In this sense, the idea of the common good is a theory of "end state" that 
measures justice according to the social outcomes rather than the rules of fair play 
(Christiansen, 1989). 
Communitarianism appreciates common good tradition —from Plato to Aquinas—
arranging it in relation to some of the concerns of liberalism —such as respect for 
individual rights— but aspiring to a society in which the basic needs of all are met and all 
share the benefits of progress in the quality of life. So the concept of justice, from a 
communitarian perspective, should incorporate a positive duty of beneficence—an issue 
that liberals refuse absolutely (Quinn, 1996). 
Therefore, regarding the concept of justice I have been elaborating, I can recognise the 
influence of communitarian thinking as this concept recognises the relationship of the 
value of justice with others such as beneficence  (See 2.4; 3.4). Similarly, as this concept 
requires a more strong role of the agent who will be acting for the good of the recipient 
of such actions and the good of himself (See 4.3; 4.4) it will be important that such 
account be rooted in the same understanding of a shared good, a ‘comon good’ necessary 
to the goods that are owed and more specifically what defines others’ rights (See 4.5).  
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5. The account of Justice in Health 
 
5.1. The right to health 
As I pointed out in the previous chapter, a concept of justice is not complete if it does not 
give an account of rights, and what I take for a right is, on the one hand, that which is 
owed to another, and on the other hand, the good to which a just action must intend; so 
that a right is to be understood as the object of justice, i.e. its realization. Therefore, to 
speak about the realization of such a good we name health as the object of our just 
actions is to speak about the right to health.   
Certainly, it would be very interesting to discuss whether or not there is such a right as 
the right to health, or whether or not this is, for example, a human right. However, 
assuming that ‘recognizing the right to health is a well-established part of international 
law’ (Wolff, 2012) and therefore a matter of fact, what I will try to do is to discuss what is 
the content of such a good that is owed to people.  
A starting point to define the content of the right to health is the Constitution of the 
World Health Organization:  
‘Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not 
merely the absence of disease or infirmity. 
The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the 
fundamental rights of every human without distinction of race, religion, political 
belief, economic or social condition’ (WHO, 1946). 
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Later, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognises, as 
part of such rights, ‘the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health’ (Art 12), acknowledging that this kind of rights 
requires a series of steps to be taken by State Parties to achieving progressively the full 
realisation of them (United Nations, 1966). According to the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, the right to health ‘embraces a wide range of socio-economic 
factors that promote conditions in which people can lead a healthy life, and extends to 
the underlying determinants of health, such as food and nutrition, housing, access to safe 
and potable water and adequate sanitation, safe and healthy working conditions, and a 
healthy environment’ (CESCR, 2000).  
Therefore, we can say that the right to health is more than just the right to access to 
health care; it contains a series of other elements that determine the possibility to 
achieve the highest level of health. However, this does not mean that one has the right to 
be healthy. As Jonathan Wolff puts it, ‘the right to health seems to stand somewhere 
between the right to medical care and the right to be healthy’ (Wolff, 2012). The 
progression to the realisation of the right to health will depend on a series of social, 
economic, political and cultural factors related to the different elements that determine 
the level of health of people, being the leading one the availability of resources. In other 
words, it is not possible to specify the highest attainable standard of heath without 
considering that series of factors, either in general terms or for a given country. For, as 
Onora O’Neill argues, the standard of health a person can attain with locally available and 
affordable treatment (resources) may be too minimal, but aiming at the highest standard 
globally available would be excessively demanding (O'Neill, 2005).  
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Therefore, specifying the content of the right to health seems a problem too complex to 
solve without elaborating further about the idea of right as the realization of justice—that 
which is owed to another, and the good to which a just action must intend. 
Departing from the system proposed by Wesley N. Hohfeld (Hohfeld, 1913; Hohfeld, 
1917), we may classify rights into four types (Wenar, 2015; Finnis, 2011 pp.199-200): (a) 
‘claim-right’, where B’s claim-right means that there is a correlative A’s duty; (b) 
‘privilege’ (also known as ‘liberty-rights’), where B’s liberty-right means there is no A’s 
claim-right that interfere such a privilege; (c) ‘power’, where A’s power (relative to B) 
means that B has a liability to have his or her legal position changed by A’s action; and (d) 
‘immunity’, where B’s immunity means that A has no power to change B’s legal position.  
As ‘a claim-right is always either, positively, a right to be given something (or assisted in a 
certain way) by someone else, or, negatively, a right not to be interfered with or dealt 
with or treated in a certain way, by someone else’ (Finnis, 2011 p.200), we can identify 
the right to health as a claim-right, provided that the right to health demands somebody 
to provide healthcare and the conditions leading to a healthy life. This is not superfluous, 
as far as this implies that we need to specify the content of the right to health not only as 
a claim, but also as the obligations this entails. As O’Neill puts it ‘obligations and claimable 
rights are two perspectives on a single normative pattern: without the obligations there 
are no rights’ (O'Neill, 2005). 
It is important to point out here that human rights are usually seen as claims that set out 
requirements from the standpoint of recipients, even though they entail actions or 
restraints by others with corresponding obligations (O'Neill, 2005; Finnis, 2011 p.206). 
85 
 
 
Such a perspective may require a progressive specification of claims, as far as such 
specification allows the recipients to have a legal certainty of the benefits they can expect 
for such a claim. Nevertheless, O´Neill correctly points out the heavy human and financial 
costs for those that bear obligations derived from a progressive specification of claims—
that in turn requires increasing controls and accountability in order to secure the 
realisation of rights. Her concern is specifically focused on those whose engagement is 
essential to carry out actions required for the realisation of rights, just as ‘the farmer and 
the physician’13 are essential to have food and medicine. According to O´Neill, the costs 
for obligation-bearers are paid in ‘increasing wariness and weariness, scepticism and 
resentment, and ultimately in less active engagement’ (O'Neill, 2005). At the end, 
progressive specification of rights and increasing complexity of obligations for the benefit 
of the claim-bearers leads not only to rising costs but also to damaging the services ‘the 
farmer and the physician’ provide.  
I propose an additional problem to that pointed out by O´Neill: the one derived from 
choosing among several alternative schemes of specification —where potential recipients 
of benefits derived from the process of specification, finally are not beneficed as they 
would expect if an alternative scheme would be specified.  
As I explained previously, the Chilean health reform performed in Chile during president 
Lagos presidency, aimed at specifying the right to health in Chilean legislation through the 
introduction of the System of Universal Access with Explicit Guarantees in Health (AUGE), 
                                                     
13 O’Neill departs from the question proposed by Edmund Burke in Reflections on the revolution in France: 
‘What is the use of discussing a man’s abstract right to food or medicine? The question is upon the method 
of procuring and administering them. In that deliberation I shall always advise to call in the aid of the 
farmer and the physician rather than the professor of metaphysics’ (O'Neill, 2005).   
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which progressively has determined what medical procedures and interventions the 
patient—suffering any of a list of health problems—must receive. This was intended to 
facilitate legal enforcement of the right to health, and undoubtedly it has been successful 
in doing so (Bitran, 2013; Missoni & Solimano, 2010; Frenz, Delgado, Kaufman, & Harper, 
2014). The rationale of this runs like this: A doctor (D) who is evaluating a patient (P) 
suspects that P got a disease listed as an ‘AUGE health problem’, so D has the duty to 
inform (notify) P the suspected disease and that this is included in AUGE system, in order 
to guarantee that P knows that is entitled to enrol into the examinations to confirm the 
disease and to receive the treatments required according to official clinical guidelines. 
Each examination, procedure or intervention included has a time limit to be performed 
and a limit of co-payment if this were needed. In the case an intervention is not 
performed on time, P is entitled to claim it to her health insurer directly or through the 
Health Watchdog; and if they fail to get it done, P can claim it to the justice.  
Nevertheless, making explicit the guarantees for certain health problems meant that 
treatments for health problems not included in the list —known as ‘No-AUGE’ health 
problems— were deferred, as far as the process of establishing specific guarantees 
became in fact a way to prioritize and allocate scarce resources (BID, 2016; Greig & 
Olivares, 2015). As a consequence of this, and the growing prevalence of chronic diseases 
in an ageing population, the waiting lists for accessing healthcare interventions related to 
‘No-AUGE’ health problems are progressively enlarging and requiring more attention 
from health authorities as this became one of the main political issues at present time 
(Bossert & Leisewitz, 2016). People that are potential recipients of healthcare 
interventions for ‘No-AUGE’ problems, are any way entitled to claim them as part of their 
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right to health, however they have to wait for such interventions months or even years 
unless they were ready to spend out-of-pocket money in order to solve their problems.  
The problems just described —namely (1) the increasing burdens for those who are 
required to accomplish the specific mandates of a set of obligations derived from the 
more general right to health, and (2) the deterioration of the concrete realisation of the 
right to health for those cases that do not fit exactly to the specifications established in 
order to guarantee the right to claim the access to the healthcare interventions needed— 
seems to be consequences of the effort to make that ‘those with rights have enforceable 
claims, and  need not to rely simply on the goodwill of others’ (Wolff, 2012 Pos335). 
Assuming the standpoint of recipients —as a means to achieve the realisation of the right 
to health— entails a sort of trade-off between the gains for recipients of benefits and the 
burdens for those for whom these rights entail obligations and those excluded from 
eventual benefits in an alternative scheme or level of specification of rights. 
There is a third problem arising from the specification of the right to health when we 
stand from the recipients’ side aiming at making them enforceable claims:  it produces an 
imbalance in favour of obligations related to the right to medical care against those 
related to the right to be healthy, as the later requires a series of interventions at the 
collective (Public Health) level, such as those aiming at curbing some social determinant 
of health—which are as much difficult to translate into claimable rights as ineffective in 
terms of practicability, at least in the context constitutions that do not recognise 
collective rights. Some even question ‘whether the creation and judicialisation of health 
rights is a force good or ill’ (Flood & Gross, 2014 p.1) as this might influence in increasing 
health inequities instead of tackling them.  
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In my opinion, the progressive specification of obligations derived from human rights is 
not a completely wrong pathway— for this process has indeed resulted in important gains 
for the effective realisation of the right to health. Nevertheless, it seems a pathway taken 
too far without exploring alternative ones.  
5.2. Rights from the stand point of agent 
As I mentioned above, specifying rights such as the right to health is a task that is usually 
assumed from the standpoint of recipients—i.e. establishing obligations for agents that 
recipients can effectively claim. And this, as Wolff stated, allows recipients to avoid 
relying on the goodwill of others.  
However, not having obligations that the recipient can effectively claim does not 
necessarily mean they are relying on the goodwill of others. There are multiple examples 
of obligations that agents have to accomplish even though the recipients cannot claim 
them: parents have a duty to feed their children; men able for military service have a duty 
to serve in case of war; citizens have a duty to pay taxes to finance public schools or 
sanitary services; etcetera.  It is my opinion that they represent what would be said are 
rights specified from the standpoint of the agents, for they are described as obligations in 
terms of what an agent has to do, more than what the recipient has the right to expect be 
done or received.  
To make more clear where in my opinion lays the difference between standing from an 
agent’s standpoint and standing from a recipient’s one, I will go again to Socrates’ 
example I used before, about someone (A) who borrowed a weapon from a friend (B), 
who then went mad. If we were to specify a right standing from the standpoint of the 
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recipient (B), we will probably state that (B) has the right that (A) gives back what belongs 
to him; for this takes the form of an enforceable claim. Whereas, if we stand from the 
standpoint of the agent, we will probably say that (A) has a duty to give (B) what he owes 
to him. The latter is a more general formulation because what (A) owes (B) is not only 
giving back the weapon but also to intend the good for (B).  
To be more concrete, I will now put forward an example in the context of AUGE System: 
One of the problems included is Type 2 Diabetes. According to the corresponding 
protocol, patient suffering this disease are entitled to receive a specific antidiabetic drug 
(G). However, there is growing evidence that this drug increases mortality rate when used 
by people over 65 years old. So, even though there is a clearly enforceable claim— ‘B has 
the right to receive G if B is diabetic’— the healthcare provider has a duty to consider not 
to prescribe G and prescribe an alternative one, even though at present time, this may 
not be included as part of the claimable drugs.  
The case I just described may be useful for someone to explain legal concepts such as 
‘Duty of care’ (in countries that use Common Law) or the concept of ‘Lex Artis’ (Rules of 
the Art) used in Spain and Latin American countries; being both concepts mainly used 
when it becomes a case of negligence. Even in Bioethics it may be useful to explain the 
principles of Beneficence and Non-maleficence (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001). I will not 
discuss each of these concepts here, but just to point out that this kind of situations are 
not unknown in ethical and legal debate regarding healthcare.  
I can now formulate the content of the right to health as the realisation of that which is 
owed to others intending their highest standard of health (physical, mental and social 
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well-being). Such a formulation requires more than a progressive codification of rules and 
obligations; it requires that the agent knows the good intended to do through actions that 
those rules and obligations are made for. 
5.3. The moral agent(s) of justice in health 
In chapter 4, I stated that justice is a concept that ‘we can predicate about different 
subjects; however it is primarily predicated upon the morally relevant actions that relate 
a morally responsible agent with the recipient(s), or affected by, such an action’ (See 4.2). 
Later, I explained that when we deem some agent as a just agent, it is a virtue what we 
are attributing to him or her; and such a virtue implies that the agent has ‘the ability (or 
capacity) to act in a way that the outcome is one that can be deemed as just’ (See 4.3). I 
finished that chapter concluding a concept of justice as ‘the virtue of rendering each 
other the goods that are owed’, in other words ‘the virtue of rendering each other their 
rights’. In regarding justice in health, I stated in the previous section (See 5.2) that the 
realisation of the right to health is—as the (material) object of justice in health— the 
realisation of that which is owed to others intending their highest standard of health. 
Therefore, our task now is to identify and characterise the relevant agent(s) for justice in 
health. Undoubtedly, there are as many possible candidates as persons, groups or 
institutions exist—whose actions (or absence of actions) may be deemed as relevant for 
people to achieve the highest standard of health. And we know that health depends not 
only on individual biology and behaviour; physical and social environment also contribute 
in determining his/her health status.  
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Many activities that human beings carry out in their normal life can affect either directly 
or indirectly the health of other human beings; therefore—as far as human beings are 
moral agents—they can be deemed as just or unjust regarding that which is owed to each 
other to achieve the highest standard of health. In many cases what is owed is to restrain 
of doing that which will negatively affect others’ health; there are many examples of this: 
smoking in shared spaces, contaminating water sources, etc. There is no need to establish 
a law forbidding these actions to realise that they are morally unjust; therefore a 
virtuously just moral agent will not smoke in shared spaces or contaminate water sources.  
In other cases, what is owed is to perform some actions that will improve health status of 
others: for example, the parents must provide nutrition for their children and compel 
them to wash their hands and teeth; the teachers should teach their students to prevent 
diseases and allow them to have time for physical activities; the doctors must tell their 
patients how to manage their diseases and prescribe them the right drugs; etc. All of 
these actions are owed to others and should be done for the good of the recipients. This 
requires from the agent the knowledge of such a good intended for every recipient—and 
most importantly for each recipient. For a just parent does not give the same food to all 
of her/his children if one of them requires a special diet of gluten-free food because 
he/she suffer a celiac disease, but makes an additional effort to provide her/him the 
adequate foods.  Likewise, a just teacher should pay special attention to one student in 
the case such a student has special needs; or a doctor must spend more time and effort 
when a patient is severely ill. Nevertheless, I am not intending to build on every possible 
agent whose actions might be related to someone else´s health; I am interested in those 
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agents whose actions can affect health in order not only to improve health status, but 
also to reduce health inequalities.  
Following Onora O’Neill one can distinguish ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ ‘agents of justice’:  
being primary agents of justice those agents with the power and capacities to impose 
tasks or restrictions or assign responsibilities to other agents —the secondary agents of 
justice. Meanwhile, secondary agents of justice contribute to justice meeting the 
demands of primary agents, mainly by conforming to their legal requirements (O'Neill, 
2001).  
Although they can be individuals, the typical primary agents of justice are institutions and 
organizations with formal structures, such as states. This idea is underlying ascriptions 
made in International Human Rights Instruments, such as the ‘International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ that recognises in its preamble ‘the obligation of 
States under the Charter of the United Nations to promote universal respect for, and 
observance of, human rights and freedoms’.  
Similarly, in its article12, the Covenant expresses the commitment of State Parties ‘to take 
steps to achieve the full realization’ of ‘the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health’. So, one can say that states are 
also ‘Primary agents of justice in health’ for —in order to promote improvements on 
health status of people living within their borders— states can establish laws, rules or 
norms, and have some means of coercion to control the action other agents may perform 
that can affect health status of others.  It is also possible to count as primary agents of 
justice in health the ministers of health and those agencies established by one state—or 
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even by a groups of states, such as the World Health Organization— that are directly in 
charge of setting up special regulations, performing inspections concerning public health, 
establishing regulations for health care or planning the distribution of resources for public 
healthcare, etc.  
Here it is worth to remember that I previously said (See 4.2) that an agent can be deemed 
as a just or unjust agent insofar such an agent is a moral agent. A moral agent is the agent 
that (1) can be deemed as responsible of foreseeing and addressing the consequences of 
his/her actions or omissions, and (2) is subject to moral praise or blame for them. 
Nevertheless, I have to acknowledge that it is a contested matter to attribute a status of 
moral agent to institutions or organizations such as a state, a ministry of health or an 
international health agency. 
Moral agency entails ‘deliberating over possible courses of action and their consequences 
and acting on the basis of this deliberation’ (Erskine, 2003 p.6). In a narrow sense, the 
label of moral agent is reserved for individual human beings, as far as the deliberation 
process of human moral agents involves a series of features such as consciousness, 
rationality and intentionality among other traits that institutions probably lack. 
Nevertheless, I agree with Erskine when affirms that one might say that for its 
deliberative purposes an institution does not need to conform to all the features that 
characterises a human moral agent (p.15).  
Building upon Peter French’s idea of ‘artificial moral person’ (French, 1984), Erskine 
(Erskine, 2001) explains that an institution, as a collective, can be deemed as a 
deliberative agent insofar (1) it has the abilities and capacities to access and process 
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information and (2) it counts with structures of decision-making that will allow it to arrive 
at a predetermined goal. Similarly, institutions that we can consider as moral agents have 
(3) an ‘identity over time’ which means that such institutions cannot be spurious or 
transient, but they must have continuity. To these conditions, Erskine adds that (4) it 
must be self-asserting14 meaning that the collective sees itself as a unit. Altogether, the 
four conditions would allow an institution to become an ‘institutional moral agent’. 
In this point I shall recall Rawls’ definition of Justice I used before as a starting point in 
discussing the concept and conceptions of justice (See 4.1), which defines justice as the 
virtue of social institutions by which, on one hand, such institutions do not make arbitrary 
distinctions between persons when assigning basic rights and duties, and, on the other 
hand, social rules determine a proper balance between competing claims to the 
advantages of social life.  Now, I do not want to go back to discuss again the concept of 
justice, but to compare the idea of social institutions Rawls had in mind with the idea of 
institutional moral agents of justice I have advanced in this section.  
By an institution Rawls understands ‘a public system of rules which defines offices and 
positions with their rights and duties, powers and immunities, and the like *…+ As 
examples of institutions, or more generally social practices, we may think of games and 
rituals, trials and parliaments, market and systems of property *…+ An institution exists at 
certain time and place when the actions specified by it are regularly carried out in 
accordance with a public understanding that the system of rules defining the institution is 
to be followed’ (Rawls 1971 p.47-8).  
                                                     
14 This does not mean that it must be self-aware or conscious (Erskine, 2001  p. 72). 
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Although ‘defining offices and positions’ looks like an action, it is clear that it is not the 
intention of Rawls to assign to all social institutions, as he understand them, the character 
of moral agents of justice—at least in the same sense of what I already described— for 
the examples he gives, correspond to ‘social practices’ carried out according to certain 
system of rules assuming that such systems of rules are the social institutions. Therefore, 
one may say that (1) social institutions Rawls had in mind are not to be understood as 
moral agents—even less agents of justice in a moral sense— and (2) that primary agents 
of justice should not be understood just as the systems of rules that define the social 
practices to be followed.  
The second conclusion of the previous paragraph is also important because, effectively , 
the kind of institutions that we are concerned about—primary agents of justice in 
health— are constituted not only by the rules that define them but also by the people 
that take part of the actions that such institutions perform intending their purposes15. To 
mention this here is important because an issue that emerges when we are referring to 
institutions as moral agents is the question whether moral agency is proper of the 
institution as such or it is proper of the individuals that are part of that institution. Indeed, 
this is an important issue when we are to ascribe some moral responsibility to actions 
carried out by institutions, especially when they are primary agents that, as we said 
above, have the power and capacities to impose tasks or restrictions or assign 
responsibilities to other agents.  
                                                     
15 On saying this, I am not talking about the specific individuals that are part of an institution in a specific 
time and place, but the collective of individuals without which the institution would not exist. 
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French addresses this issue when discusses whether corporations are to be considered 
moral persons (French, 1979), asserting that to ascribe some moral responsibility to 
actions carried out by corporations is only possible if its structure of decision-making 
accomplishes a subordination and synthesis of the intentions and acts of various 
biological persons into a ‘corporate decision’. Such a decision is recognized by the policy it 
instantiates that can be properly described as a ‘corporation’s policy’. 
One can extend this rationale to the institutions that we count as possible moral agents of 
justice in health, and judge them morally responsible when they are able of —thanks to 
its structures of decision-making— deliberating over possible courses of action, 
foreseeing and addressing their consequences, and acting accordingly. Actions carried out 
as consequence of such a process of deliberation—which constitutes ‘institution’s 
policy’—should be possible to recognise by any internal or external observer as 
characteristic of institutions that aim at the realisation of that which is owed to others 
intending their highest standard of health. Similarly, one can say that deliberated actions 
carried out by an institution as agent of justice in health constitute institution’s practice 
that reveals institution’s virtue of justice.   
5.4. Justice in Health 
So far, I have arrived to an ethical account concerning justice in health that I think would 
be able to best inform health policies such as those intending to tackle health inequalities.  
This account of justice in health may be described as a virtue-based account for it 
emphasises the role of the just agent in acting to render each other what is owed, and 
because it considers that to realise the justice in health such an agent requires to have a 
an idea of what is the highest attainable standard of heath considering the series of 
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factors that determine such a standard. Similarly, this requires from the agent the ability 
or capacity to act in a way that the outcome can be deemed as just (See 4.3; 5.3).  
When it comes to define health policies then, not only the specification of rules that 
would define what the rights of the people that those policies are intended for, but to get 
agents of justice that will be able to act habitually as a just agents. The main agents in this 
role are those that I named primary agents of justice in health, which must be understood 
as moral agents even though they will frequently be institutions or organisations, such as 
states, ministries of health, public agencies and international agencies. The important 
issue here is that those agents must have the capacity to deliberate and act accordingly; 
and therefore be deemed as responsible of achieving for the people they serve the 
highest standard of health. 
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Part III: Informing a New Health Policy  
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6. Justice in Health and the Problem of High-Costs Treatments  
6.1. The Problem of High-Costs Treatments  
The Chilean Health system reform performed during president Lagos’ mandate, as 
described before (See 1.2.) intended to realise the right to health through explicit 
guarantees (AUGE) and to reduce inequalities in health. To elaborate the list of health 
problems included in AUGE—and the interventions required— the Ministry of Health has 
to consider (1) the burden of disease, (2) the effectiveness of interventions and (3) their 
cost-effectiveness.  
Most of high-costs diagnostic procedures and treatments are expensive because the 
diseases they are made for are low-frequency conditions or even rare conditions, so their 
burden of disease is lower compared to many more frequents health problems. Likewise, 
cost-effectiveness for this kind of treatments is lower given their higher costs; even they 
had a similar effectiveness. Therefore, under AUGE system it is very difficult that very 
expensive treatments for rather infrequent diseases become covered; leading to a 
paradoxical situation for a system that aims at reducing inequalities in health:  
Suppose two persons (A and B) suffering different diseases (X and Y) that are possible to 
treat with x’ and y’ respectively, and x’ and y’ have similar effectiveness. The only 
important difference for A and B is that X is significantly more frequent than Y, so X’s 
burden is significantly higher than Y’s burden. In this case, x’ has a lot more chances to be 
included in AUGE than y’. There are cases that x’ and y’ are the same intervention and the 
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only difference is that it is useful either for X or for Y; even in this case it could happen 
that the same intervention is guaranteed when the diagnosis is X and not when it is Y.  
A concrete example of such a paradox (which I call ‘AUGE’s paradox’) is the surgery for 
hip replacement. This surgery is guaranteed for people suffering hip osteoarthritis, a 
disease that is frequent among elder people causing an important burden of disease but 
it is not guaranteed for people suffering a hip avascular necrosis, which is significantly less 
frequent than osteoarthritis.  
Nevertheless, not being covered in AUGE system does not mean that a treatment has not 
coverage. This means that, for instance, opportune access is not guaranteed. When it 
comes to the financial protection this means that some diseases or treatments had partial 
or no coverage, so patients have to make out-of-pocket payments that could be 
significant. According to estimates (DESAL, 2016), in 2012 an average of 6.3% of family 
budget in Chile was allocated to direct health expenditures; 4% of families incurred into 
catastrophic expenditures (more than 40% of family budget) and 0.43% of households felt 
under poverty line because of catastrophic expenditures.   
6.2. ‘Sick people also march’ 
Ricarte Soto was a journalist and figure of Chilean television. In 2010, he was diagnosed 
an advanced lung cancer and the only possible treatment to grant him some chances of 
survival was a high-cost medicine.  Even though such a treatment was not covered by 
private or public insurances, he was able to afford its high expenses. After two years of 
treatment he appeared on TV talking about his disease and saying ‘At some point I felt 
uncomfortable about having the means to do everything quickly, because in cancer 
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everything has to be done quickly ... Then I said 'why am I such an idiot; the problem is 
not that I receive this kind of care, the problem is that in Chile many cancer patients do 
not have the possibilities that I have’ (Emol.com, 2012). He then started a personal 
crusade to press the authorities to create a mechanism to finance universal coverage for 
high-cost treatments. His crusade led to an impressive social mobilization during 2013 
that had its peak in May when more than ten thousand people suffering some disease 
participated in a march in Santiago —many of them on wheelchairs. After such a 
demonstration and Ricarte Soto’s death in September, the issue became one of the key 
issues for the presidential elections at the end of that year, and most of the candidates 
promised to create a mechanism to deal with the financing of high-cost treatment. 
Immediately after assuming as president, Dr. Michelle Bachelet instructed to her cabinet 
to propose a bill to create a mechanism to finance high-cost treatments not included in 
AUGE system. As Vice-Minister of Public Health, I was commissioned to lead the 
elaboration of the proposal and later to participate in the parliamentary debate that 
concluded with a law that ‘Creates a financial protection system for high cost diagnoses 
and treatments and render posthumous tribute to Don Luis Ricarte Soto Gallegos’ 
enacted in June 2015 (Law No. 20,850, 2015) which became known as ‘Ricarte Soto’s Law’ 
(LRS). 
6.3. Ricarte Soto’s Law  
The LRS creates a system that provides universal coverage and financial protection to all 
users of health care system—regardless of their socioeconomic status—that require a 
high-cost diagnostic procedures or treatments (medicines, special foods or medical 
devices). Which diagnoses and treatments are included in this system are defined through 
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a process that includes an active participation of patients and other civil society 
representatives. Until now and as a first step, the LRS considers the diagnosis and 
treatment of 14 health problems. 
LRS defines high-cost diagnostic procedures as ‘the set of benefits that are demonstrably 
useful for the confirmation and subsequent control and treatment of the disease, when 
their costs impede access to treatment or have a catastrophic impact on the expenditure 
of the beneficiary’, meanwhile defines high-cost treatments as ‘medicines, foods or 
elements of medical use associated with diseases or health conditions and for the 
services essential for diagnostic confirmation and follow-up, which by their cost prevent 
access to these, or accessing, catastrophically impact on the beneficiaries' spending’ (Law 
No.20,850; 2015 Art.2). The key concept of these definitions is the notion of catastrophic 
expenditure. In order to implement the previous conceptions of what is considered high-
cost and catastrophic expenditure both Ministry of Health and Ministry of Finance 
defined high-cost as health expenditure of a household exceeding 40 percent of the 
average family income, discounted basic living expenses. For the period 2015-2018 the 
calculated threshold is USD 3,720 a year; this means that only technologies costing more 
than this are potential candidates for LRS’s coverage.  
In order to be able to determine what high-cost diagnoses and treatments will be finally 
covered the Law establishes a process that includes four steps: (1) Scientific evaluation of 
the evidence, (2) feasibility evaluation, (3) prioritised recommendation and (4) decision. 
The four steps are summarised below:  
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(1) Scientific evaluation of the evidence: the Under-secretariat of Public Health16 carries 
out a scientific evaluation based on available evidence, for the diagnosis or treatment 
of a specific health condition. To define which diagnoses and treatments will be 
evaluated, the Under-secretariat of Public Health must take into account the opinions 
and recommendations of technical advisory commissions, patient groups and citizens; 
the latter, through the Office of Information, Complaints and Suggestions (OIRS).  
Scientific evidence is obtained through the review of studies of effectiveness in 
databases and is complemented with reports of evaluation of health technologies of 
recognized international agencies, such as the National Institute for Care and Health 
Excellence (NICE), Canada's Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technologies in Health 
(CADTH), Australia's Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee (PBAC) and the 
Institute for Health Technology Assessment (IETS) in Colombia. Evaluations include 
the following elements: (a) Relative effectiveness and effectiveness on criteria such as 
mortality, disease-free or progression-free life years, and quality of life; (b) Patient 
safety through the health registry and the drug or techno-surveillance performed by 
high health surveillance agencies; (c) Economic evaluation, which includes evaluation 
of payment terms through the risk-sharing mechanism and budget impact and price 
regulation (d) Ethical, legal and social repercussions 
(2) Feasibility evaluation: this is carried out by Under-secretariat of Healthcare Network 
to the technical and logistical capacities of the public, private and armed forces 
                                                     
16 The Ministry of Health of Chile has two Under-secretariats: the Under-secretariat of Public Health that 
assumes the role of protection of collective health through epidemiological surveillance and collective 
interventions such as immunisation and the role of elaboration of public policies and regulatory 
frameworks; meanwhile, the Under-secretariat of Healthcare Network coordinates and controls the public 
healthcare services including primary, secondary and tertiary services. 
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healthcare network, in order to provide high-cost diagnostic procedures or 
treatments that under evaluation by the Under-secretariat of Public Health. Feasibility 
evaluation and scientific evaluation of the evidence are included technical report has 
to be published 15 days before the next step.  
(3) Prioritised recommendation: This is a novel and key step established in the LRS. 
Article 8 mandates the creation of a Prioritised Recommendation Commission (CRP), 
composed of 10 experts selected through a process of public examination of their 
qualifications (in the fields of medicine, public health, economics, bioethics, health, 
drugs, medical devices and special foods) and two representatives elected by patient 
organizations. The role of CRP is pretty much like the role of a jury in a trial in anglo-
saxon countries: the evidence obtained through the previous steps in the process is 
presented to the members of CRP who later deliberate on the scientific, economic 
and social value of the high-cost diagnoses and treatments evaluated. The 
deliberation is recorded and is part of the CRP report. The conclusion of such a report 
is a public recommendation to the Minister of Health of prioritisation of the list of 
high-cost diagnoses and treatments evaluated. CRP’s recommendation can be 
challenged by any person within 5 business days after publication. 
It is important to note that CRP has some innovative aspects: (1) it includes 
representatives of patients; (2) participation of experts is strongly regulated to ensure 
their independence and to avoid potential conflicts of interest: it forbids participation 
of: (a) anyone with personal or relative interest up to the fourth degree of 
consanguinity and second degree of affinity; (b) any individual who has received total 
or partial financing, monetary transfers or contributions of any nature for travel, 
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consulting, consultancy, research or any other activity, whether for personal use, his 
spouse or partner, or any relatives up to the fourth degree of consanguinity and 
second of affinity; (c) anyone that have a share in the ownership of registrations, 
patents, sanitary authorization of drugs or in the ownership of healthcare facilities. 
These inabilities apply to within 24 months prior to appointment.  
(4) Decision: in this step, Ministry of Health and Ministry of Finance determine the 
diagnosis procedures and treatments that will be finally covered. The Ministry of 
Finance guarantees financial sustainability. The services included in this final package 
should not exceed 80% of the fund allocated for that year. 
To ensure participation of the community and accountability in the implementation of 
LRS, law mandates the creation of the Citizen Commission for Monitoring and Control 
whose function is to advise the Ministers of Health and Finance, monitor the operation of 
the system and make recommendations through the generation of an annual report. The 
members of this commission are four representatives of patients, two representatives of 
scientific societies, two academics from medical faculties, and four health experts 
appointed by the Minister of Health. They hold their position during a four years period. 
Currently, LRS covers treatments for 14 diseases (11 since 2016 and three that were 
added this year) and it has benefited 5,990 patients since its entry into force. 
6.4. Justice in Health and Ricarte Soto’s Law 
As I described in previous sections of this chapter, LRS was a response to the high-cost 
treatments’ problem. AUGE system, which was intended to realise the right to health 
through explicit guarantees and to reduce inequalities in health was unable to deal with 
106 
 
 
this problem. On the contrary, the rules established in AUGE system to define which 
treatments are to be included as guarantees make it very difficult that high-cost 
treatments get coverage. This represents a failure—at least partial— on achieving its 
objectives and the kind of equity it was supposed to look for: a ‘Democratic Equality’, 
where social and economic inequalities produce benefits for everyone and particularly for 
the least advantaged. Lack of coverage for high-cost treatments make them impossible to 
access for less advantaged and put in risk of impoverishment those that are not in 
poverty. 
The failure of the AUGE system regarding high-costs treatments does not imply a failure 
on the account of justice that supposedly justified the implementation of such a system; 
Rawls himself proposes a method of ‘Reflective Equilibrium’ (Rawls, 1971 pp.19-21, 48-
51) that in a narrow sense consists on a back and forward process to ‘eliminate 
irregularities’ and make fit moral judgements with the set of general moral principles 
(Daniels, 1996) (Daniels 1996 p.67). Indeed, regarding the problem of high-cost 
treatments, it was possible to evaluate and re-formulate the rules of AUGE system in a 
way that it was able to deal with such a problem. 
However, after a process of deliberation within the Ministry of Health and between this 
and the Ministry of Finance, the government decided to create the system that LRS later 
embodied. The reasons for this decision were on one hand, to avoid that changes on 
AUGE could result on emerging new problems for whom this government may be blamed 
in the future (the ‘political’ reason); on the other hand, to introduce more flexibility in the 
decision-making process; as we were aware that establishing a set of rules that by 
themselves would allow to define what high-costs treatments should be guaranteed 
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would be a very complex task as it could not include usual tools such as calculating the 
burden of disease or the cost-effectiveness of the treatments due to the problems 
exposed before (See 6.1.) (the ‘technical’ reason).  
It is important to note that a more ‘flexible’ process of decision-making does not mean 
lack of rules or procedures; it means that decisions would not necessarily depend just on 
rules or procedures defined beforehand. It was clear that a new system should require 
rules for example to gather and to evaluate the scientific evidence of candidate high-costs 
treatments and it was also clear that in some point a decision that would lead to include 
some treatments and to exclude other treatments should be taken; a decision that should 
be deemed as a just decision.  
In order to give public guarantee that decision would be transparent and not arbitrary, we 
proposed to strengthen the capacities of the Ministry of Health creating a formal space of 
deliberation that would allow representatives of civil society to participate on the 
decision-making process.  Likewise, this proposal was an opportunity for me to see in 
practice the idea of treating the Ministry of Health as an institutional primary agent of 
justice.  
So far, the decisions made as part of LRS system has not being criticised because of the 
selected treatments to guarantee, but only because the number of treatments to 
guarantee could be higher whether the Ministry of Finance would provide more resources 
for funding..  
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Conclusions  
Through the present thesis I have conducted an enquiry exploring the role of justice when 
informing health policies such as the reforms of health systems or those aimed at tackling 
health inequalities.  
I firstly found that competing accounts of justice inform different positions regarding 
political decisions in health; nevertheless, political debate is barely aware of the sources 
of the differences between those different positions. This makes it harder to find the 
consensus required to shape policies that have wider support so they become more 
effectives in pursuing the objective of achieving the highest standard of health possible.  
Similarly, it is possible to conclude that none of the accounts that at present time are at 
stage disputing the role of informing the decisions regarding the distribution of benefits 
and burdens in the society is good enough when it comes to health matters. In fact, most 
of the major representatives of political philosophy, as Rawls, avoid including health as a 
matter of study of their respective theories. And those that adventure to do so have 
difficulties to demonstrate coherence between their starting point and the proposals they 
arrive, like Daniels. Certainly, I am neither concluding nor suggesting that such theories of 
justice or justice in health respectively should be dismissed; for firstly, they do not 
pretend to develop an omni-comprehensive theory—as Rawls acknowledges (1985)—that 
gives an answer for every possible questioning. Although, the intention of people like 
Rawls, Daniels and many others is to settle certain principles from which one can derive 
rules of action when it comes to dilemmas regarding distribution of benefits and burdens. 
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And their proposals are pretty sound for people that are concerned with the problem of 
health inequalities. 
Nevertheless, the challenge that inequalities in health represent demand from us to 
question such accounts either to perfection them through a better understanding or to 
use alternative accounts that maybe could better inform our decisions in health policy. 
I tried to do so revisiting the very concept of justice and in my enquiry I found that the 
fundamental basis of this is that justice is a relational concept that involves actions that 
relate agents with recipients regarding a relevant good. So, when it comes to the moral 
judgement to deem something as just what is right is not the only that matters but also 
the good that is intended for the recipient. Then, there is no sense of establishing a sort 
of precedence of the right over the good.  
In performing actions under the scope of justice, the agent put in practice the virtue of 
justice and in doing just actions the agent becomes virtuous in its benefit and in the 
benefit of the recipient(s) of such actions. In order to carry out just actions the agent 
requires the knowledge of the good that intend with such actions.  
When we think about role of institutions as agents of justice it is important to 
acknowledge that they are moral agents insofar they are able to deliberate and act 
accordingly for what they can be morally praised or blamed, i.e. they are morally 
responsible. Then, it is a central task when dealing with health policies to realise that 
moral agency of the institutions is a central issue; and that those polices should consider 
how they implies improving their abilities and capacities to deliberate and to act 
according to such deliberation. 
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The example of implementing a new system to address the unequal access to high-costs 
medicines and its impact in the socio-economic situation of those that need to get them 
was a good opportunity to put in practice this account, designing a mechanism of 
deliberation that involves participation of patients in an institutionalised way.  
 Indeed, there are many issues that probably were left aside in the development of this 
enquiry, some of them consciously others not. I apologises of that if they were necessary 
to understand the content of this thesis.  In any case, there would be important in the 
future to continue this enquiry addressing some of those issues left aside. 
One important issue that requires further research concerns the content of the good that 
is intended when actions are made intending the highest standard of health. As we realise 
that actions are driven intending some good, developing an account of goodness as 
rationality (as the reason-to-act) is a central matter for informing just decisions in health. 
Another important issue that should be relevant to address in further research is the 
impact that progressive specification of the right to health has on agents in health field 
especially for those that have to decide about issues that are relevant for justice. 
Finally, it is also important to further study what is required to allow agents in health 
either individuals or institutions to perfect their role as agents of justice and becoming 
virtuous in doing so.  
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